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Two Essays On The Economics Of Education
Abstract
In this dissertation I address different topics in education policy, taking advantage of utilizing both micro-data
and economic theory. The dissertation consists of two chapters, both using Chilean data. In chapter 1, The
Impact of College Admissions Policies on The Performance of High School Students, I empirically evaluate
the effects of college admissions policies on high school students' performance. In particular, I empirically
demonstrate how increasing equality of opportunity may lead to a boost in average academic effort and shed
light on the efficiency of alternative affirmative action policies. The results of this chapter suggest that
affirmative action should not be seen only as a way to democratize the access to tertiary education, but also as
a way to increase the motivation and performance of high school students. Methodologically speaking, this
research contributes to the economic literature by estimating a rank-order tournament with heterogeneous-
ability contestants.
In Chapter 2, A Dynamic Model of Elementary School Choice, I study how parents choose a primary school
for their child. The approach of this chapter has three main contributions to the previous literature. The
empirical strategy allows me to distinguish between first among different sources of observed preferences for
private vis-`a-vis public schools, and second among different causes of unequal access to high-quality schools.
In the paper I model and empirically estimate how parents may have misperceptions about school quality,
because test scores depend on school quality and on the socioeconomic status (SES) of the school's
population, parents can confound these two effects, confusing high quality schools with schools that have
higher SES students. The paper contributes to the sparse literature on structural estimation with bounded
rationality.
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ABSTRACT
TWO ESSAYS ON THE ECONOMICS OF EDUCATION
Nicola´s A. Grau Veloso
Kenneth I. Wolpin
In this dissertation I address different topics in education policy, taking advantage
of utilizing both micro-data and economic theory. The dissertation consists of two
chapters, both using Chilean data. In chapter 1, The Impact of College Admissions
Policies on The Performance of High School Students, I empirically evaluate the
effects of college admissions policies on high school students’ performance. In par-
ticular, I empirically demonstrate how increasing equality of opportunity may lead
to a boost in average academic effort and shed light on the efficiency of alterna-
tive affirmative action policies. The results of this chapter suggest that affirmative
action should not be seen only as a way to democratize the access to tertiary edu-
cation, but also as a way to increase the motivation and performance of high school
students. Methodologically speaking, this research contributes to the economic liter-
ature by estimating a rank-order tournament with heterogeneous-ability contestants.
In Chapter 2, A Dynamic Model of Elementary School Choice, I study how parents
choose a primary school for their child. The approach of this chapter has three
main contributions to the previous literature. The empirical strategy allows me to
distinguish between first among different sources of observed preferences for pri-
vate vis-a`-vis public schools, and second among different causes of unequal access
to high-quality schools. In the paper I model and empirically estimate how parents
may have misperceptions about school quality, because test scores depend on school
quality and on the socioeconomic status (SES) of the school’s population, parents
can confound these two effects, confusing high quality schools with schools that have
higher SES students. The paper contributes to the sparse literature on structural
estimation with bounded rationality.
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Chapter 1
The Impact of College Admissions
Policies on The Performance of
High School Students
1.1 Introduction
There is a continuing debate about how to reduce socio-economic and racial segrega-
tion in universities. To this end, many countries have affirmative action programs,
intended to increase the probability of college admissions for targeted populations
(e.g. of a particular race or family income). In general, existing evaluations of these
programs focus on the application rates of students benefiting from affirmative ac-
tion, and the academic performance of those who are admitted.1 Since the existing
evaluations generally assume high school student behavior to be exogenous, a missing
part of this discussion is how high school students may consider the impact of their
1For instance, in a interesting paper, Arcidiacono (2005) structurally estimates the effects of re-
moving admission preferences and financial aid race-based advantages on African American earnings
and educational choices. A similar approach where factors such as applications costs, geography,
and supply-side competition play a role -relative to the costs of high-school academic achievement-
is Epple, Romano, and Sieg (2006). Other related research includes Bowen and Bok (1998), Card
and Krueger (2005) and Long (2004). A summary of the literature before 2000 can be found in
Holzer and Neumark (2000).
1
effort levels on their university admissions chances and react to different admissions
policies accordingly.2
To fill this gap, this paper addresses empirically the effect of college admissions on
high school student effort and performance in response to policy changes. In particu-
lar, I estimate the structural relationship between college admissions policies, which
determine the probabilities of being admitted by different universities, and the stu-
dent effort decision in high school.3 I address this question using Chilean data for
the 2009 college admissions process, whose features and richness particularly suit
the question raised in this research. In the absence of changes in college admis-
sions policies, I use the estimated model to perform some ex-ante policy evaluation
experiments.
I model the college admissions process and high school behavior in a static fashion,
where students make two decisions: whether or not to take the national test which
is necessary for college admissions, and their academic effort during high school.
The exerted effort positively impacts the expected performance in high school and
on the national test for college admissions. For those students who decide to take
the college admissions test, admissions policies are based on a linear combination of
high school grades and the test scores, such that higher values lead to admission at
better universities. Hence, the admissions process works as a tournament in which
students decide their effort and whether or not to take the college admissions test,
2Theoretically and motivated by U.S. legal changes, a series of papers, e.g., Chan and Eyster
(2003); Fryer, Loury, and Yuret (2008); and Hickman (2011) have focused on how the prohibition
of explicit consideration of race in the admissions process may be quite inefficient if the colleges still
have some preferences toward minorities. Below, I discuss the literature that empirically addresses
the impact of affirmative action on student behavior.
3It is an empirical question whether student effort impacts student performance. In this paper,
the parameters which drive the relationship between these two things in the model are estimated.
Schuman, Walsh, Olson, and Etheridge (1985) report four different major investigations and sev-
eral minor ones over a decade, none of which were very successful in yielding the hypothesized
substantial association between the amount of study and GPA. Such an unexpected result is, from
different angles, contradicted by Eckstein and Wolpin (1999), Eren and Henderson (2008), Rau
and Durand (2000), Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2004), and Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner
(2008). Related to this literature is the difficulty of having a proper model for cognitive production
function. In this regard, Todd and Wolpin (2007) find the most support for the value-added models,
particularly if those models include some lagged input variables (see also Todd and Wolpin (2003)).
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taking into account the effort cost, the national test’s fixed cost, how much they
value future pay-offs, and their chances of being admitted to a better university.4
Because this is a tournament (i.e., the amount of university seats are fixed), any
admissions policy implies winners and losers.5 Yet it is relevant to study who are
the winners (or losers) and to find out if there are any policies that raise the total
average high school performance.
The database, which has 146, 319 observations, is built using five sources of infor-
mation: (1) PSU, the national test for college admissions; (2) RECH, the Ministry
of Education’s data, which includes GPA and attendance information for all high
school students; (3) SIMCE 2004 and 2006, a nation-wide test taken by all 14- and
16-year old students. This source provides information about student performance,
measures of effort and learning skills, and characteristics of their families and of pri-
mary and secondary schools. (4) Futuro laboral, Ministry of Education’s data from
tax declarations which links individual wages to majors and universities. Finally, (5)
admissions requirements, data from each university that includes the test’s weights
for the final score definition and the final cutoff scores (the minimum score for admit-
tance) for each major. While the first three sources are linked through an individual
ID, the last two can be merged to link final-score cutoff with future payoffs.
The model estimation is carried out in two stages. In the first stage, I estimate all the
parameters of the test production function by two-stage least squares, since I have
more than one measure for the endogenous variable (i.e., high school student effort).
In the second stage, using some parameters estimated in the first stage, I estimate
the utility parameters, the distribution of the unobserved learning skills, and the
4There is vast literature, with mixed evidence, to study the impact of college and its quality
on future earnings, e.g., Brewer, Eide, and Ehrenberg (1999); Dale and Krueger (2002); Dale and
Krueger (2002); James, Alsalam, Conaty, and To (1989); and (with Chilean data) Reyes, Rodr´ıguez,
and Urzu´a (2013). It is worth noting that while the literature has focused its attention on how to
control for the student and college selection, this is not necessarily relevant in my approach because
the important feature in my model is not how much students are actually going to earn, rather
what they believe is the impact of attending different universities on their future earnings.
5To read more about the theoretical implications of rank order tournament, refer to Lazear and
Rosen (1981).
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parameters of the measurement equations by a maximum likelihood procedure. I
follow this approach mainly because most of the parameters are estimated in the
first stage, leaving just a few parameters to be estimated in the second stage, which
is more time consuming.
The simulation of the estimated model fits most of the data features reasonably well.
In particular, it successfully fits the unconditional and conditional test distributions,
and the probability of taking the national test for college admissions across different
groups, where both are endogenous variables in the model. Moreover, the simulated
final-score cutoff (i.e., the minimum weighted average score for being admitted in
each university) replicates data patterns. In the case of exerted effort, both the
correlation between the effort measures and the simulated effort and the signs of
the factor loadings of the effort measurement equations go in the right direction;
both are positive. However, the share of total variance due to estimated effort is
quite small for the effort measurement equations. I discuss to what extent this is a
drawback and present some evidence that this issue is mainly due to the quality of
the measures of the effort as opposed to shortcomings of the model.
Two policies (counterfactual exercises) are simulated in this paper, intended to equal-
ize opportunities. The first one is a SES-Quota system, implying that for each uni-
versity the SES distribution is the same as the one in the population. In the second
policy experiment, I simulate what happens if the GPA weight is increased, which
in practice implies that the probability of attending better universities for those
students who attend low income high schools is increased. This is due to the fact
that while the high school GPA of each student is to some extent relative to her
classmates, the national test scores are relative to the student’s national cohort and
therefore capture the difference in high school quality, which is highly correlated with
income.
There are several lessons from these counterfactual experiments. (1) Average effort
significantly increases as opportunities are equalized across different socioeconomic
4
groups. (2) This leads to a moderate improvement in high school students’ perfor-
mances, which is relatively important for some groups. (3) Although the effects on
performance are moderate, the evidence supports the idea that modeling effort and
the decision to take the PSU are important in order to anticipate what would happen
with the main features of the college admissions system (e.g., student allocation).(4)
The highest change in exerted effort comes from those students who also change
their decision about taking the college admissions test. (5) Neither of these policies
increases the percentage of students taking the national test for college admissions,
which is consistent with the fact that in this policy implementation there are win-
ners and losers. However, there are relevant variations in who is taking such a test;
in particular, this percentage increases for low-income students and those who have
higher level of learning skills. (6) Because the SES-Quota system uses the existing
information more efficiently, it implies a more efficient student allocation to equalize
opportunities.6
There are few papers that take students’ behavior in high school as endogenous, as I
do in this work. Here I summarize three of them.7 The first two, Domina (2007) and
Ferman and Assunc¸aˆo (2011) present some reduced form estimations that address
how changes in affirmative action policies change students’ behavior in high school.
In the third paper, which is the closest to my research, Hickman (2010) models the
behavior of U.S. high school students as a function of their future chances of being
admitted to different universities.
In particular, Domina (2007), using panel data for Texas high schools between
1993 and 2002, shows evidence that Texas’ post-Hopwood higher education poli-
cies boosts high school students’ academic engagement at public schools.8 Opposing
6Here, efficiency means to allocate students with respect to their expected GPA and PSU test.
7To the best of my knowledge, there are not any others. In a related paper, Hastings, Neilson,
and Zimmerman (2012) show how motivation can change the exerted effort of the students, in
particular that the opportunity to attend a better high school has positive and significant effects
on both student attendance and test scores.
8Among other things, Texas’ post-Hopwood higher education policies include a guarantee that
all students who finished in the top 10% of their high school class will be admitted to their chosen
public university.
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this is Ferman and Assunc¸aˆo (2011), who used difference-in-difference techniques and
quasi-experimental data from Brazilian secondary education, where political forces
abruptly imposed an admissions quota for two of Rio De Janeiro’s top public uni-
versities. They estimate that the quota altered incentives, thus producing a 5.5%
decrease in standardized test scores among the favored group, a 25% widening of the
achievement gap.
There are two considerations worth pointing out. These studies tell us something
about how different ways of increasing the admissions probabilities of the most segre-
gated groups may have different impacts on high school student behavior. However,
a structural approach is required in order to have some idea about which admissions
policies accomplish an efficient combination of diversity and correct incentives.
To address this issue, Hickman (2010) uses U.S. data to structurally estimate a model
of college admissions, where the admissions test is an endogenous variable, using
empirical tools borrowed from auctions literature.9 One of his main findings is that
current affirmative action policies narrow the achievement gap and the enrollment
gap, but a color blind system results in higher academic achievement in the overall
student population. His other finding is that the quota system prohibited by U.S.
law is superior to both of the other policies in three dimensions: it produces the
highest academic performance; it substantially narrows the achievement gap; and,
by design, it closes the enrollment gap completely. Importantly, he does not, nor do I,
have data from before and after some policy change, and thus he uses the structure
of the model to perform ex ante policy evaluation. Yet, his and my paper are
complementary and are the first attempts to structurally estimate the relationship
between college admissions system and high school student behavior.
Beyond technicalities, the main differences between my paper and Hickman (2010)
are: (1) My theoretical approach does not impose a distinct university type for
each admitted student. (2) Given that I have data for the student regardless if she
did or did not take the college admissions test, I can see how different admissions
9The model is described in detail in Hickman (2011).
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rules change the number of people who apply to college, whereas his approach is
conditional on admission. Furthermore, it turns out that in my estimation and,
hence, in my simulations this decision plays a central role. (3) Finally, given that
I observe measures of effort and a set of variables which determine the student
performance in my data, the impact of the effort decision is established in a more
transparent way, and it is possible to compare the magnitude of the effort’s effect
with that of the other determinants. Yet, the differences in our approaches are mainly
motivated by different access to data and the particular traits in the institutional
design of the two educational systems (American and Chilean).
My paper has three main contributions. First, it empirically shows how high school
student effort would react to different college admissions policies, establishing that
increasing the level of equal opportunities leads to a boost in the average effort.
Second, it estimates a rank-tournament with heterogeneous ability contestants.10
Third, the paper exploits the interaction between economic theory and factor analysis
models in the identification and estimation of the model, and in the analysis of the
results.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 details the features of the model. Section
1.3 describes the Chilean college admissions process, explaining the main features of
the data. Section 1.4 discusses the empirical implementation of the model and proves
the identification of the model’s parameters. Section 1.5 presents the estimation
procedure. In Section 1.6, the model fit is discussed along with other aspects of
the estimation results. Section 1.7 describes the counterfactual experiments results.
Finally, Section 1.8 concludes and discusses future research.
10Vukina and Zheng (2007) present the first attempt to estimate a structural model of an empiri-
cally observed rank-order tournament as a strategic game with private information. As the authors
posit, the structural estimation of rank-order tournament games with heterogeneous ability contes-
tants is cumbersome as this assumption results in equilibrium strategies that are nonsymmetric.
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1.2 The Model
The aim of this model is to capture how college admissions policies may affect the
effort exerted by high school students. Students have two decisions to make: whether
or not to take the college admissions test, a necessary input for university admittance;
and they must decide how much effort to make during high school. The exerted effort
positively impacts expected high school and college admissions test performance. For
those students who decide to take the college admissions test, admissions policies
consider both high school grades and the test score, such that higher measures lead
to admittance by better universities.
The college admissions test scores and GPA production technologies are functions of
high school and student characteristics. To have a tractable problem, it is assumed
that there is a finite space of individual and school characteristics. Thus, let i ∈
{1, 2, ...,M} denote the student-school type; the vectors of observed and unobserved
individuals characteristics of student type i are given by {xi, λi}, whereas the mass
of those students is denoted by mi.
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There are N − 1 university types, each one offering the same major.12 But, because
they have different quality levels, each university implies some specific future pay-off
{R1, R2, ..., RN}, such that Rn+1 > Rn ∀ n and R1 is the pay-off for those who were
not admitted to college (because they did not try or their final score was too low).13
Each university n has a fixed and exogenous amount of seats Sn (S1 > 0 is the
residual: the mass of students who are not admitted to any college, i.e.,
∑
imi =∑N
δ=1 Sδ). Hence, the admissions process works as a tournament in which students
11Although from the model’s perspective it does not make any difference what is and is not
observed by the econometrician, I introduce this notation in the model description to keep the
same notation throughout the paper.
12This is something that is possible to relax given my data (although it is challenging in terms
of the model). In fact, I can have people with different interests and universities teaching different
majors, which will create different markets. However, in this model and in my current empirical
specification I do not assume such heterogeneity.
13To keep a tractable specification, in this model I am not considering individual heterogeneity in
future pay-off and in credit constraints. Using Chilean data, Urzua and Rau (2012) show evidence
of the impact of short-term credit constraint on dropouts.
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decide their effort ei and whether or not to take the college admissions test TCATi,
taking into account the effort cost, the test’s fixed cost (FCi ∼ N(F¯C, σ
2
fc)), how
much they value future pay-offs, and their chances of being admitted by each uni-
versity.
Let FSi be the type i college admissions final score, such that:
FSi = Ppm ∗ PMi + Ppv ∗ PVi + Pg ∗GPAi, (1.1)
where PMi, PVi and GPAi are the math test, the verbal test, and the high school
GPA, respectively; whereas Ppm, Ppv and Pg are the associated weights. The pro-
duction function of these tests are:
PMi = β
pm
0 + xiβ
pm
1 + eiβ
pm
2 + λiβ
pm
3 + ε
pm
i , (1.2)
PVi = β
pv
0 + xiβ
pv
1 + eiβ
pv
2 + λiβ
pv
3 + ε
pv
i , (1.3)
GPAi = β
g
0 + xiβ
g
1 + eiβ
g
2 + λiβ
g
3 + ε
g
i . (1.4)
εki ∼ N(0, σ
2
k), ε
k
i ⊥⊥ ε
k′
i ∀ k 6= k
′ and E[εki |xi, λi] = 0, ∀ k ∈ {pm, pv, g}.
Given the number of people who actually take the college admissions test, the seats
offered by each university, and the final score distribution of those students, the
vector r ({r2, r3, ..., rN}) represents the final minimum score needed to be admitted
by each university type. Throughout the paper, I denote this vector as the final-
score cutoff. Hence, the students who are going to be part of the university n are
those who have a final score greater than or equal to rn and smaller than rn+1. The
former inequality is given by the admissions rule, whereas the latter is due to utility
maximization.
The utility function, for those who choose to not take the college admissions test, is
given by:
9
U0(e) = θ1R1 + θ2GPA(e)−
e2
2
, (1.5)
For those who decide to take the college admissions test, the utility is:14
U1(e) = θ1
N∑
n=1
Rn1(rn ≤ FS(e) < rn+1) + θ2GPA(e)− FC −
e2
2
, (1.6)
where 1(A) is an indicator function which takes the value of 1 when A is true and 0
otherwise, and θ1 and θ2 represent the importance of future pay-offs and the impor-
tance of high school student performance, respectively. The cost of effort is quadratic
and its parameter is normalized to one.15
There are two considerations to be made about students’ utility function. On one
hand, students make their effort decision before the realization of the shocks (the
distributions are common knowledge). For that reason, they maximize expected
utility. The only private information used in the student decisions is the value of FC,
though the distribution is common knowledge. On the other hand, all information
about the other students that each one needs in order to make her effort decision
are the values of r. Moreover, due to the facts that each student anticipates the
behavior of other students and that there is a continuum of individuals of each type,
the value of the vector r is predicted without uncertainty, even though the final score
is a random variable.
Student’s Problem
Given a vector r, the optimization problem for those who do and do not take the
national college admissions test can be written as:16
14r1 = −∞.
15In the empirical implementation of the model, I allow for some heterogeneity, which does not
qualitatively change any outcomes of the model.
16Φ denotes the standard normal distribution function.
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max
e≥0
U0i (e) = max
e≥0
{
θ1R1 + θ2(b0i + b1ie)−
e2
2
}
,
max
e≥0
U1i (e) = (1.7)
max
e≥0
{
θ1
N−1∑
n=1
(Rn −Rn+1)Φ
(
rn+1 − a1ie− a0i
ση
)
+ θ1RN + θ2(b0i + b1ie)− FC −
e2
2
}
.
(1.8)
Where:
a0i = Ppm ∗ (β
pm
0 + xiβ
pm
1 + λ
pm
i β
pm
3 ) + Ppv ∗ (β
pv
0 + xiβ
pv
1 + λ
pv
i β
pv
3 )
+ Pg ∗ (β
g
0 + xiβ
g
1 + λ
g
iβ
g
3),
a1i = Ppm ∗ β
pm
2 + Ppv ∗ β
pv
2 + Pg ∗ β
g
2 ,
b0i = β
g
0 + xiβ
g
1 + λ
g
iβ
g
3 ,
b1i = β
g
2 ,
ηi = Ppm ∗ ε
pm
i + Ppv ∗ ε
pv
i + Pg ∗ ε
g
i .
Therefore, the decision about taking the test is given by:
TCATi =
 1 if maxe≥0 U1i (e) ≥ maxe≥0 U0i (e)0 if maxe≥0 U1i (e) < maxe≥0 U0i (e) (1.9)
Lemma 1: Given a vector r, the student’s problem (1.7) has at least one solution.
Proof: When the student does not take the college admissions test (TCAT = 0), it
is clear that there exists a unique optimal solution, equal to θ2b1i. On the other hand,
when the student does take the college admissions test (TCAT = 1), for any vector r
and regardless the level of effort, the marginal revenue of effort is upper bounded by
e¯i = θ1(RN −R1)+ θ2b1i and lower bounded by ei = θ2b1i. Thus, because the effort’s
11
marginal cost is e, it should be the case that the optimal effort decision for student
i belongs to the interval [ei, e¯i].
17 Given that the objective function is continuous in
e and the relevant set is compact, for all i, there is also an optimal solution when
TCAT = 1. 
Therefore the student’s problem is characterized by the following first order condi-
tions:
For those who do not take the college admissions test:
eˆ0i = θ2b1i. (1.10)
For those who take the college admissions test:18
eˆ1i = θ1
N−1∑
n=1
(Rn+1 − Rn)φ
(
rn+1 − a1ieˆ
1
i − a0i
ση
)
a1i
ση
+ θ2b1i, (1.11)
⇒
TCATi =
 1 if Di ≥ FCi0 if Di < FCi (1.12)
Di = θ1
(
N−1∑
n=1
(Rn −Rn+1)Φ
(
rn+1 − a1ieˆ
1
i − a0i
ση
))
+ θ1(RN −R1)
+ θ2b1i(eˆ
1
i − eˆ
0
i )−
(eˆ1i )
2 − (eˆ0i )
2
2
.
As pointed out, since U0i is strictly concave, the first order condition is sufficient and
the solution in that case is given by θ2b1i. A sufficient condition for strict concavity
17In fact, any positive effort implies a non-negative probability of attending to any university,
thus the optimal effort can not be equal to e. This means that, for all students, their optimal effort
when TCAT = 1 is larger than the optimal effort when TCAT = 0, i.e., the solution is interior.
18φ denotes the standard normal density.
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of U1i is given by ∀ i : θ1(RN − R1)a
2
1iφ(1) < σ
2
η , ∀i.
19 When this condition is
fulfilled, the solution to (1.11) is unique and e1i is continuous in r, which is always
the case for e0i . This continuity is important for the general equilibrium analysis.
It should be noted that the vector {eˆ0i , eˆ
1
i } does not vary across students of the same
type. However, the final effort decision (eˆi = (1− TCATi) ∗ eˆ
0
i + TCATi ∗ eˆ
1
i ) varies
within each type, due to the fact that TCATi depends on the fixed cost realization,
which is specific to each student.20
General Equilibrium
Let m˜i be the mass of students of type i who take the college admissions test, then:
21
m˜i = miΦ
(
Di − F¯C
σfc
)
A general equilibrium in this setting is given by a set of vectors eˆ0, eˆ1 and rˆ, such
that:
• Given rˆ, ∀ i:
– eˆ0i = θ2b1i,
– eˆ1i = θ1
∑N−1
n=1 (Rn+1 − Rn)φ
(
rˆn+1−a1ieˆ
1
i−a0i
ση
)
a1i
ση
+ θ2b1i,
– Dˆi = (U
1
i (eˆ
1
i , rˆ) + FCi)− U
0
i (eˆ
0
i ).
• ∀ n = 2, ..., N :
19This is shown in Appendix A.1.
20Therefore, eˆi could be confusing due to effort heterogeneity within group i, since for some of
the students who are type i, this is equal to eˆ0i and for the others it is equal to eˆ
1
i . The same holds
for TCATi.
21Again, even though students just observe their own fixed cost realization; this mass can be
predicted without uncertainty by the students due to the continuum of individuals of each type.
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N∑
δ=n
Sδ =
∑
i
m˜i
[
1− Φ
(
rˆn − eˆ
1
i a1i − a0i
ση
)]
=
∑
i
miΦ
(
Dˆi − F¯C
σfc
)[
1− Φ
(
rˆn − eˆ
1
i a1i − a0i
ση
)]
.
Thus, in this setup the vector r has a similar role as prices in a Walrasian equilibrium,
in the sense that its value is set such that the number of students admitted in each
university is equal to its number of seats.
Lemma 2: If ∀ i : θ1(RN − R1)a
2
1iφ(1) < σ
2
η and
∑
imiΦ
(
θ1(RN−R1)− ¯FC
σfc
)
>∑N
δ=2 Sδ, there exists at least one equilibrium.
Proved in Appendix A.1.
The sufficient conditions for existence have clear interpretations. On one hand, the
first condition implies that the effort decision can not be overly important for the
final score determination (given by the ratio a1i
ση
) and that the differences in the
future pay-offs can not be overly relevant (given by θ1(RN − R1)). Hence, to be
sure about the equilibrium existence requires that the impact of the effort on the
utility is moderate. On the other hand, the second condition is more innocuous and
establishes that the national test’s fixed cost cannot be too big in comparison with
future pay-offs. Otherwise, even when all the elements of r are close to −∞, there
are not enough students taking the national test to fill all of the seats offered by each
university.
Lemma 3: In the case where N = 2, the equilibrium is unique when it exists.
Proved in Appendix A.1.
Although there is not a proof for N > 2, in Appendix A.1 I present a result which
limits the potential extent of multiple equilibria. In particular, it narrows the possi-
bility of having high and low effort equilibria.
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It is worth mentioning that the potential lack of uniqueness is not an issue in the
estimation of the model. In fact, to calculate the likelihood function it is only
necessary to solve the first order conditions of the student’s problem as opposed to
the general equilibrium. The latter is not calculated in the estimation given that I
observe the final-score cutoff (r) in the data. Thus, in the case of having more than
one equilibrium, the estimation procedure selects the one that the students actually
played. The usefulness of narrowing the potential extent of multiple equilibria is for
counterfactual experiments.
1.3 The Chilean System for College Admissions
and Data Description
In the Chilean educational system, students can continue their studies after high
school at types of tertiary institutions: the selective (the best and most prestigious
universities) and the non-selective (some universities and technical institutions). In
2009, 29% of 18 to 25 year-olds were attending some type of tertiary institution.22
The Chilean university system is highly structured: after knowing their final admis-
sions score (a linear combination of high school GPA and test scores), students apply
for a particular college major at a particular university. They can apply for more
than one major at any given school. The vast majority of the college courses corre-
spond to the core of the specific major. In other words, other than her college major
choice, the student has little agency in choosing the components of her academic
training. In this system, each university has an admission quota for each major.
As considered in the model, to be admitted into the selective universities, the student
must take a national college admissions test (PSU); math and verbal are mandatory
while certain majors require additional tests. Most of the selective universities have
an explicit formula to calculate the final score (different weights for the PSUs and
22CASEN 2009 (Chilean survey for socioeconomic characterization).
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GPA are considered). Thus selection is simply based on the final score ranking. A
few selective universities have a less transparent admissions process, but from the
data it is possible to see their implicit final score cut-off.
For the 2009 admissions process, among the 212, 656 students who finished high
school, 56, 437 (27%) did not take the college admissions test and 156, 219 (73%)
took it.23 Because the national test can be taken once per year and because those
who change majors must retest, a percentage of those taking the college admissions
test finished their secondary studies more than one year before. In this paper, I only
use data for those students who finished high school in 2008 (and who didn’t repeat
any grades between 2004 and 2008). For the cohort, those students represent 84.5%
(179, 725 of 212, 656) of the total.24
There are five sources of information in this paper; the first three are linked through
an individual ID.25
• PSU: the national test for college admissions. These are census data provided
by the DEMRE (Department of Educational Evaluation, Measurement and
Recording).
• RECH: Ministry of Education’s data. It includes information for all high
school students. It provides the annual average attendance for each high school
student, their GPA, and all high schools in which each student was enrolled.
There is an identification number for each high school that can be used to link
this RECH data with many other sources of high school information (including
SIMCE’s information).
23Those are the students who took the college admissions test in December 2008. The academic
year is from March to December.
24In the analysis I need high school students’ data, which is not available for students who finished
high school before 2008.
25The Ministry of Education of Chile has all individual information with RUT (Chilean national
ID), but for confidentiality reasons this data is given to the researchers with a new ID, which
is useful to link the different data bases provided by the Ministry, but stops linking with other
databases at an individual level.
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• SIMCE 2004 and 2006: Nation-wide tests taken by students in the eighth
grade of primary school (14 years old) and the second grade of secondary (16
years old). These tests are designed to measure the quality of the system, are
public information, and do not have any direct consequences for the tested
students. During the week of the test, parents are surveyed to characterize
students’ families. From that survey, I have information on the students per-
formance, some proxy measures of effort and learning skills, and characteristics
of their families, primary, and secondary schools.
• Futuro Laboral: Ministry of Education’s data from tax declarations which
link individual wages to major and attended university. This public access
database contains some statistics about the distribution of wages for each area
of study.26 In particular, it includes the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th per-
centiles along with wage means, one and five years after leaving college for
each area of study.From this I can infer the average pay-off associated with
each university and college major.
• Admissions requirements: Data from each university that includes the
tests’ weights for the final score definition and the final-score cutoffs for each
major. It is possible to link this information with the previous wage informa-
tion.
The final database contains 146, 319 observations, where the difference between this
number and 179, 725 (who did not repeat any grade between 2004 and 2008) is mainly
for two reasons: (1) lack of data for the 2004 SIMCE for some students, and/or (2)
lack of socioeconomic information for some students. In Appendix A.2 there is a
description of the variables considered is this paper along with some statistics.
Something worth highlighting is the fact that all independent variables that deter-
26The definition of area of study is quite fine. In fact, there are 105 areas, which in many cases
imply that an area contains only one major.
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mine the effort decision are discrete.27 This feature of the data implies that I have
student types, namely, groups of students who share the same characteristics. The
existence of types has two positive and important consequences. First, it helps to
speed up the estimation, since the effort decisions, more precisely eˆ0i and eˆ
1
i , are
the same for all students belonging to the same type. Second, it better suits the
theory, because the higher the cardinality of each student type (described in Table
1.1), the assumption of a continuum of agents within each type is closer to the data
specification.
Table 1.1: Cardinality of the student types groups
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N
Size of student types 56.36 135.40 1 1447 2596
To be able to estimate the model, a few decisions should be made to adjust the data
to model simplifications. First, in the model universities differ only in quality (i.e.,
there is only one major), and each student has the same ranking for these universities.
In this regard and in the empirical implementation of the model, I consider twenty
university types, where the first one is the residual (for those who either do not take
the college admissions test or have a final score below r2).
Second, to define Rn and rn I proceed using the following steps:
• In the admissions process, I assume that all universities only consider GPA,
math and verbal PSU scores (i.e., they do not consider the other PSUs). Fur-
thermore, I assume that all universities use the same weights (0.3 for both
PSUs and 0.4 for GPA).28 Thus, I have one final-score cutoff for each student
who took the college admissions test.
27All of them are discrete by nature. But in order to have this feature in my data, I did not include
a few variables that were continuous, e.g., family income (which may have significant measurement
error).
28They are close to the mode in my data base. They can not be exactly the mode in order to
have weights that add to one.
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• I use the information of the fifth year’s wages for each area of study.29
• I classify each major of the admissions requirements database into one of the
areas of study of the Futuro laboral data base. By doing so, I have the final-
score cutoff and the future wages percentiles associated with a particular major
(one distribution across universities), for each major/university. Thereafter, I
linearly extrapolate the wage percentile information that I have to obtain all
deciles for each major.
• In order to have a database containing one final-score cutoff and one future
wage for each major/university, I assume a positive monotonic relationship
between final-score cutoffs and future payoffs. In particular, for each ma-
jor/university, I first calculate the decile of that university in the distribution
of final-score cutoffs for that particular area of study, and then impute the
wage for that decile (from the distribution of wages for that particular area of
study), such that the wage’s percentile x is merged with the final-score cutoff’s
percentile x. The outcome is a relationship between the final-score cutoffs and
future payoffs that is plotted in Figure 1.1.
• To group the university-degree points into twenty “university types,” I first
non-parametrically estimate the relationship between future payoffs and the
final-score cutoffs, plotted in Figure 1.1. This creates a monotonic relationship
between these two variables. I then define the groups using cluster analysis,
where the universities are grouped by similar future wages.30
29The resulting final-score cutoffs are quite similar if I use first year’s wages.
30I use k-means clustering algorithm.
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Figure 1.1: Imputed fifth year wages and locally weighted regression
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Finally, to define the number of seats for each university type Sn, I calculate how
many students, coming directly from high school, had final scores between rn and
rn+1. This means that all my counterfactual experiments will assume that the share
of students who come directly from high school is invariant to policy experiments.
In Table 1.2, the resulting final-score cutoff (r), payoffs (R), and seats available (S)
for each university are presented.
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Table 1.2: Universities’ payoffs and cutoff scores
University R r S
1 730407 0 Residual
2 813903 437 5114
3 823605 450 2160
4 858348 455 9231
5 887939 476 1869
6 889166 480 1904
7 911408 484 6498
8 954100 498 3738
9 988201 506 1913
10 1007949 510 1881
11 1054916 514 8783
12 1121856 533 6825
13 1175584 548 4107
14 1226456 558 4868
15 1315568 570 9462
16 1428676 596 5180
17 1541462 613 5727
18 1696450 635 6611
19 1966697 669 4356
20 2245443 704 3847
R is in Chilean Pesos. In 2009, one Dollar
was 559.67 Pesos.
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1.4 Empirical Specification and Identification
For the empirical implementation, besides the functions that determine the final
score, I consider several measures and tests, which are useful to identify the pa-
rameters of interest in the context of latent variables. Following the factor model
literature, I assume that there are three unobserved variables for which I have mea-
sures (i.e., proxies): λi (learning skills), e
p
i (student effort at primary school), and e
h
i
(student effort at secondary school). The last is modeled in the paper, while the first
two are treated as unobserved heterogeneity. Moreover, I take advantage of the panel
data in order to have learning skill measures before the effort decision was made,
which is the endogenous variable in my model. The learning skills are assumed to
be scalar and time invariant.31
I assume λ is independent of x. This assumption is not relevant for the identification
argument presented in this paper but it reduces the number of parameters to be
estimated. Moreover, as shown below, the results of the estimation seem to support
this assumption.
The measures considered are: the final score determinants, i.e., 2009 PSUs (PM, the
math test; and PV the verbal test) and high school GPA; the SIMCEs (2004 and
2006); and some direct measures of effort and unobserved learning skills. Hence, the
empirical implementation is characterized by the following equations.
Final Score Determinants:
PMi = β
pm
0 + x
h
i β
pm
1 + e
h
i β
pm
2 + λiβ
pm
3 + ε
pm
i , ∀i s.t. TCATi = 1, (1.13)
PVi = β
pv
0 + x
h
i β
pv
1 + e
h
i β
pv
2 + λiβ
pv
3 + ε
pv
i , ∀i s.t. TCATi = 1, (1.14)
31In the context of the papers. Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach (2010) and Heckman, Stixrud,
and Urzua (2006), these learning skills variables would be closer to non-cognitive skills given the
measures that I have.
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GPAhi = β
gh
0 + x
h
i β
gh
1 + e
h
i β
gh
2 + λiβ
gh
3 + ε
gh
i . (1.15)
High school performance and effort measurements:
SIMCEhji = β
sjh
0 + x
h
i β
sjh
1 + e
h
i β
sjh
2 + λiβ
sjh
3 + ε
sjh
i , j ∈ {verbal,math}, (1.16)
Mehji = x
ejh
i β
ejh
1 + e
h
i α
ejh + εejhi , j ∈ {1, ..., Jeh} Jeh ≥ 2. (1.17)
Primary school performance, learning skill and effort measurements:
SIMCE
p
ji = β
sjp
0 + x
p
iβ
sjp
1 + e
p
iβ
sjp
2 + λiβ
sjp
3 + ε
sjp
i , (1.18)
j ∈ {verbal,math, natural science, social science},
GPA
p
i = β
gp
0 + x
p
iβ
gp
1 + e
p
iβ
gp
2 + λiβ
gp
3 + ε
gp
i , (1.19)
Me
p
ji = x
ejp
i β
ejp
1 + e
p
iα
ejp + εejpi , j ∈ {1, ..., Jep} Jep ≥ 2, (1.20)
Mλ
p
ji = x
λjp
i β
λjp
1 + λiα
λjp + ελjpi , j ∈ {1, ..., Jλ} Jλ ≥ 2. (1.21)
In this setup, I assume that all the εis are normally and independently distributed.
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Namely, conditional on observable variables, the correlation across equations is only
given by the unobserved skill heterogeneity. In Appendix A.2, there is a description
of the different dependent and independent variables used in the estimation. The
following are relevant for the identification analysis:
32There is one exception: ελ1pi is not normal because, as specified below, Mλ
p
1i is binary and a
linear probability model is assumed.
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• Mλp1i, Me
p
1i and Me
h
1i are measures of learning skills, the exerted effort at
primary school and the exerted effort at secondary school, respectively. As
usual in factor analysis, there are the following normalizations: αe1h = αe1p =
αλ1p = 1. As will be shown, to ensure identification it is necessary to have at
least one measurement being a linear function of each unobservable and one
more measurement which does not need to be a linear function of the latent
variable.33 The variables used are: 1) for learning skills, a binary variable
that takes the value of 1 if the student had repeated at least one year and 0
otherwise (I use a linear probability model); 2) for the effort exerted at primary
school, attendance for the last year of primary school; 3) for the effort exerted
at secondary school, the mean of the student attendance over the four years of
secondary school.34
• As Cunha and Heckman (2008) stress, because the tests only contain ordinal
information, it is more appropriate to anchor the scale of the latent factors
using measures with an interpretable metric, as the ones used in this paper.
• In order to gain flexibility, in the estimation, the model specification has an
effort cost that is individual specific. This allows different effort decisions
among students who are not taking the college admissions test, otherwise eˆ0i =
θ2b
g
2. In this specification, instead of
e2
2
the cost of effort is exp(θ3i)
e2
2
, where:35
θ3i = θ
1
31(Like math = 2) + θ
2
31(Like math = 3) + θ
3
31(Like spanish = 2)
+ θ431(Like spanish = 3).
33I also assume that xλjpi , x
ejp
i and x
p
i do not have elements in common, and the same for x
ejh
i
and xhi ; this just for simplicity.
34Using attendance as a measure of effort is a common practice; see for example Hastings, Neilson,
and Zimmerman (2012)
35In the SIMCE 2004, the students are asked about how much they like to study math and
Spanish and the possible answers are: strongly agree, agree, disagree, and strongly disagree. Given
that few people choose the last category, I take three values: 1 if the student strongly agrees, 2 if
the student agrees, and 3 if the student disagrees or strongly disagrees.
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Which implies that θ3i is normalized to zero, and the cost is equal to
e2
2
, when
the student strongly agrees about the statement: I enjoy the study of math
and Spanish.
In terms of the model characterization, the cost heterogeneity does not im-
ply any relevant changes. In fact, this new specification has the same struc-
ture as the previous one, but with new parameters θ˜1i = θ1 exp(−θ3i), θ˜2i =
θ2 exp(−θ3i) and F˜C i ∼ N(F¯C exp(−θ3i), σ
2
fc exp(−2θ3i)).
Identification
To the extent that the final goal of this paper is to perform counterfactuals related to
the college admissions process, the objects which must be identified for this analysis
are {βpm, βpv, βgh}, {V ar(εpmi ), V ar(ε
pv
i ), V ar(ε
gh
i )}, {θ, F¯C, σfc, ση} and the distri-
bution of λ. The identification strategy, developed in Appendix A.3, has three steps.
First, I identify the final score’s expectation and variance.36 Second, I non para-
metrically identify the distribution of learning skills. Third, I identify the utility
parameters from different moments of the measures of effort.
1.5 Estimation
The estimation is carried out in two stages. In the first stage, following the identifica-
tion analysis presented above and the standard approach to deal with measurement
error in independent variables (both effort and learning skills), I can consistently
estimate all the parameters of the test equations ((1.13), (1.14), (1.15), (1.16) and
(1.18)) by a two-stage least square. In the second stage, using relevant parame-
ters from the first stage, I estimate the utility parameters, the distribution of the
unobserved learning skills, and the parameters of the measurement equations by
maximum likelihood procedure. I follow this approach mainly because most of the
36If V ar(εpmi ) , V ar(ε
pv
i ) and V ar(ε
gh
i ) are identified, then ση is also identified.
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parameters are estimated in the first stage, which only takes a few seconds, leaving
just a few parameters to be estimated in the second stage.37 In terms of numbers,
161 parameters are estimated in the first stage, whereas 84 are estimated in the
second stage.
Let Ωs be the set of parameters estimated in the s stage (s ∈ {1, 2}, Ω = {Ω1,Ω2}).
The estimation procedure for the second stage has the following steps:
• Guess the initial values for all the parameters, Ω02 (this includes the parameters
of the learning skills distribution).
• Given Ω02, r, R, and X , find the effort decision for each student. There are
two features of this procedure that speed up this calculation. First, given that
the final score cutoff is observed, the general equilibrium is not required.38
Second, the first order conditions, which lack a closed form solution, should
only be solved for the 2, 596 student types.
• Calculate the likelihood function.
• Continue with a new guess until finding the Ω2 that maximizes the likelihood
function.39
There are some features of this procedure that are worth highlighting. The distribu-
tion of unobserved learning skills is approximated by a discrete distribution of four
types. This approach has two advantages: first, it is consistent with the model, in
which there is a mass of students for each type. Indeed, these discrete unobserved
types allows for multiple students for each type (which permits a better approxima-
tion to the theoretical equilibrium). Second, it speeds up the estimation, because
37This is a big gain in time, given that in each iteration the model needs to be solved (which
takes around 30 seconds for each set of parameters).
38Because I only need to calculate the first order conditions of the student’s problem, the esti-
mation method used is maximum likelihood as opposed to simulated maximum likelihood.
39This is done using the derivative free solver, HOPSPACK.
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the student optimization has to be solved just once per student type in each iter-
ation. Meanwhile, some of the parameters that are estimated in the second stage
can also be estimated in the first stage (e.g., the factor loadings as shown in the
identification argument). I prefer estimating those parameters in the second stage
to give to the model a better chance of fitting the data (the model is solved just in
the second stage). Additionally, the distribution of the unobserved primary school
effort is not estimated. Instead, I calculate the projection of one of the continuous
measures of that effort on its other measures and then replace the primary school
effort by that projection. Finally, when I have missing data in one of the measures
(high school effort or learning skills), I assume that it is random and don’t consider
the contribution to the likelihood of this measure for such a student; I don’t have to
drop the entire data point.
To have a clear picture of the likelihood function, in Appendix A.4, I describe the
contributions of different data to the likelihood.
1.6 Results
The first stage estimation results are presented in Appendix A.5 (Tables A.8, A.9,
and A.10). Some aspects of these estimations are worth mentioning. First, for the
OLS regressions where the dependent variable is either high school effort or learning
skills and the rest of the measures are independent variables, the magnitudes, signs,
and statistical significances are generally all fine. Although in some cases the r
squared is fairly small, the instruments are not weak.40
Second, in the case of the OLS regressions where one of the secondary education
performances is the dependent variable (Table A.12), which are the equations whose
parameters determine the effort decision, the estimated parameters are as expected in
terms of statistical significances, magnitudes, and signs. In particular, the magnitude
40The F statistics are: 16.99 (Primary School Attending Regression), 103.19 (Secondary School
Attending Regression), and 58.09 (Repetitions Linear Probability Regression).
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of the parameters related to effort and learning skills are quite relevant.
Finally, the second stage OLS for the primary education performance presents some
problems (Table A.11). Indeed, the effect of effort (predicted with instruments) on
SIMCEs is in the wrong direction. Nevertheless the effect is in the expected direction
for the GPA equation.41 Furthermore, the effect of the predicted learning skills is
positive and highly relevant in all equations.42
The parameters estimated in the second stage are shown in Appendix A.5 (Table
A.13).43 As in the first stage, the vast majority of the estimated parameters have
the expected sign. The only exceptions are two of the effort cost’s parameters θ33 and
θ43. Given the non-linear relationship between the parameters and model’s outputs,
the best way to assess the relevance of parameter magnitudes is through model fit
analysis and counterfactual experiments.
Model Fit
To study how well this model fits the data, I simulate it given the estimated param-
eters. Due to the size of the database, I only draw one vector of shocks per student.
Although in the estimation procedure only the first order conditions of the student’s
problem are solved, because the final-score cutoff (r, the general equilibrium object)
comes from data, in the simulation I have to calculate the general equilibrium. Thus,
the first element to consider in model fit analysis is how close the simulated rn are
in respect to the ones that come from data.44 In this regard, Figure 1.2 shows that
the simulated vector r captures the trend and magnitudes of the data fairly well.
41In both cases, the effect is statistically significant.
42The parameters are negative because the variables are ordered from more to fewer skills.
43Some parameters are estimated in both stages. In that case, I keep for simulations the ones
estimated in the second stage.
44The computational algorithm to solve the general equilibrium of the model works as follows:
(1) Draw the individual cost of taking the PSU and the individual shocks for PSU tests and GPA.
(2) Guess an initial value for final-score cutoff r0. (3) Given r0 and the parameters of the model,
calculate the optimal effort and optimal decision about taking the PSU, for each student. (4) Given
the shocks and effort decisions, calculate the new final-score cutoff (r1), which solves the general
equilibrium condition. (5) Stop if this new r1 is close enough to r0 (maxn∈{1,...,N−1} |r
0
n− r
1
n| < ǫ),
otherwise restart from point (2) with r1 as the new guess.
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Figure 1.2: Final-score cutoffs for 2009 university admissions process
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
Universities
sc
o
re
 c
u
to
ff 
 
 
Data
Model
Though the model shows a good fit in all the aspect of the data, given that the goal
of this paper is to study how different college admissions policies may affect high
school students’ behavior, I focus my attention on the model fit for those tests that
are relevant in the admissions process, along with the student test decision. Figure
1.3 shows that the model replicates the test distribution observed in the data.45
Moreover, in Appendix A.5, Table A.14 shows that the model is able to replicate
student performance across different groups relatively well, although it shows some
discrepancies in socioeconomic groups 3 and 4.46
45The discrepancies in the case of high school GPA are because the data is discrete and there are
agglomerations in some grades, something that can not be replicated by the model.
46Appendix A.5 contains Figures A.1 and B.4, which show the model fit of the densities for the
remaining tests (2004 and 2006), where all of them show good fit.
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Figure 1.3: Model fit in tests determining final score
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(b) PSU verbal
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(c) GPA at high school
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Furthermore, the simulated model also fits the data patterns with regard to the
fraction of students taking the PSU across different groups, which is important since
one of the two decisions considered in my model is whether to take the national ad-
missions tests. Indeed, Figure A.3 (Appendix A.5) shows how the simulation of the
model replicates this fraction, particularly the patterns and, with some discrepan-
cies, the magnitude, across gender and high school socioeconomic groups, maternal
and paternal education, and high school categories (public, private subsidized, and
private non-subsidized).
The second student decision modeled is how much effort to exert in high school. In
the context of this paper, with many measures of effort, it is not totally clear how
to assess the model fit in the effort dimension. However, following the factor models
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literature, I propose four ways to evaluate such a fit, namely: (1) the correlation
between the measures and effort (simulated by the model); (2) the sign and sta-
tistical significance of the factor loadings, i.e., parameters that multiply the latent
effort decision in each measurement equation; (3) the share of total variance due to
estimated effort; and (4) the ratio between the share of total variance due to esti-
mated effort (when effort is modeled) and the ratio of share of total variance due to
estimated effort (when effort is not modeled and its distribution, conditional on X, is
non-parametrically estimated). Because the latter involves an estimation procedure
that needs explanation, I first focus on the former three criteria.
In this respect, Table 1.3 presents mixed evidence. On one hand, both the corre-
lations and the signs of the factor loadings are in the right direction, positive. On
the other hand, in all of the cases, the share of total variance due to estimated ef-
fort is quite small, where in the best case it is just above 2%. As it is shown in
the third column, the share of total variance due to controls is also small for those
measurement equations that include controls.
Table 1.3: Correlations and Variance Decomposition for Effort Measures
Corr(Measure,effort) Share of Total Share of Total Ratio of Share of Total Residual
(Factor Loading) Residual Variance due Residual Variance Variance due to estimated
to estimated effort (Theory) due to controls effort (Theory/non paramteric)
Attendance 0.136162 0.022099 0.11
Parents perception 0.075444 0.003973 0.12
about student effort (0.109920)
Reading school books 0.096300 0.000546 0.019111 0.11
at home (0.040786)
Using a proper space 0.122651 0.000717 0.017227 0.12
to study at home (0.046577)
Using calculator to 0.101369 0.000493 0.010817 0.11
study at home (0.038827)
As discussed in a previous section, all the remaining measures of high school effort
explain a small fraction of the variance of high school attendance. Thus, part of the
reason why the share of total variance due to estimated effort is quite small could be
the small correlation among measures of effort. In other words, the problem could
be that these measures only share a small part of information (the latent factor).
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However, this issue can also be explained, since there could be different reasons
why students exert effort in high school, and my model captures only one of them.
To distinguish between these two possible explanations, measurement error versus
modeling drawbacks, I build criteria four (described below).
From the identification analysis, it is clear that it is possible, in the sense that all the
parameters are identified, to estimate the parameters of this set of equations (tests
and measures) without using the theory developed in this paper to calculate student
effort (conditional on parameters). In particular, as is usual in factor analysis (e.g.,
Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua (2006)), I assume that the student effort is drawn
from a mix of three normals, which allows for enough flexibility in estimating the
density of the factor. Therefore, by doing this estimation I find the density of effort
which is consistent with all measures of effort and other tests, since the only thing
that I change in respect to the previous estimation is how to calculate high school
effort. In this case, simulated maximum likelihood is required.47 This nonparametric
estimation should capture all the information that is not observed and is consistent
with the tests and measures of effort. In this context, I conceptualize this information
as the density of effort, where such a latent effort decision is not necessary due to
considerations of how effort is going to change future chances of being accepted to
a better university. In other words, this density establishes a benchmark for my
model. The variance that is not explained by this distribution is not captured by
any theoretical model of effort, since it is due to pure measurement error.48
The last column of Table 1.3 shows that around 11-12% of the variance of the
nonparametric distribution of effort is captured by my model. Such a result implies
that if the model is correct, only 11-12% of the variance of effort could be explained
by modeling how student behavior is determined by future chances of being admitted
to a better university. Moreover, this means that, though building a model of effort
requires strong assumptions and abstractions from reality, the main problem is the
47I also use a reduced form approach for the equation that determines the test taking decision.
48The details of this estimation and the resulting parameters are available upon request.
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noisiness of the measures of effort.
Is this a relevant issue? I do think that, in general, it could be an issue, but that
is not the case in this paper. Under the regular assumption that the errors are iid,
having highly noisy measures should affect the precision of the estimated parameters,
in particular the standard errors of the factor loadings. However, in this paper all
the standard errors are small enough to have statistical significance.49
Unobserved Types
As usual in structural estimations, discrete unobserved types improve the fit of the
model. Although in this paper I depart from this tradition by using measures for
latent unobserved learning skills, it is still the case that these types have a relevant
role in fitting the data. In fact, Table 1.4 shows that the impact of these types on
tests are between 0.5 and 1.5 standard deviations (medium low versus low), 1 and
2.5 standard deviations (medium high versus low) and 2 and 4 standard deviations
(high versus low).
Figure 1.4: The impact of types on tests
High v/s Low Medium high v/s Low Medium low v/s Low
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
βtest*(Tx−T4)/σtest
St
an
da
rd
 d
ev
ia
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
te
st
s
 
 
Simce verbal
Simce math
GPA
PSU verbal
PSU math
49The only exception is the fixed cost parameter.
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In this approach, it is possible to check the validity of the assumption used in the
estimation, that types are independent of X. Indeed, given the estimated πt (i.e.,
the unconditional probability of being type t), the conditional probabilities can be
recovered by the Bayes rule, such that:50
πit|x =
πtLi(Ω|Typeλ = t)∑
τ πτLi(Ω|Typeλ = τ)
.
Consequently it is possible to see how these probabilities vary across different groups.
In fact, Figure A.4 (Appendix A.5) shows that the independence assumption does
not seem that restrictive: there are not any relevant differences in conditional prob-
abilities across gender, maternal education, paternal education, and high school cat-
egories. However, there are some important differences across socioeconomic and
urban/rural high school conditions.
1.7 Counterfactual Experiments
Two policies (counterfactual exercises) are performed in this paper, where both are
intended to equalize opportunities. In the first one, a SES-Quota system is estab-
lished, which imposes that, for each university type, the SES distribution is the same
as the population. In other words, if, in the whole system there are x% of students
attending high schools of socioeconomic group i, then there should be x% of students
belonging to each high school type in each university type. In practice, the way to
get this outcome is by having a tournament within each socioeconomic group (keep-
ing the weights constant for each PSU test and GPA), such that the seats available
for students attending high schools socioeconomic group g in university type n is
equal to Sn ∗
(
#students SES g
#students in the system
)
, in which case there are five vectors r (one for
each socioeconomic group).
In the second counterfactual experiment, I simulate what would happen if the GPA
50These conditional probabilities are used in all the simulations and counterfactual experiments
performed in this paper.
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weight was increased, which in practice implies that the probability of attending
better universities for students from low income high schools is increased.51 This is
because, while the high school GPA of each student is, to some extent, relative to
that of her classmates, the national test scores are relative to the student’s national
cohort. Therefore they capture the differences in high school quality, which is highly
correlated with income.
From these exercises, I study the impact on effort, tests, and probability of taking
the college admissions test. Moreover, I compare both systems in terms of efficiency.
By having the same socioeconomic composition by university, I study which sys-
tem implies the most efficient student allocation, where efficiency means allocating
students with respect to their expected GPA and PSU test.52
The first aspect to review from these experiments is how do they change the univer-
sities’ socioeconomic composition, which is presented in Figures A.5, A.6 and A.7
(Appendix A.6). On one hand, the first set of plots confirms the outcome of SES-
Quota system, namely, that each socioeconomic group is proportionally represented
in each university. On the other hand, increasing GPA weights implies more low-
income students attending top universities. For example, increasing the GPA weight
from 0.4 (the baseline) to 0.5 leads to a moderate increase in the fraction of students
attending top universities who come from low and medium income high schools (SES
1, 2, and 3). As expected, this change increases when the new GPA weight is 0.7,
in which case the fraction of the students admitted to the top five universities who
belong to SES 1 is doubled, the fraction of the students admitted to the top three
universities who belong to SES 2 is also doubled, and the same is true for the top
university for SES 3. All these increments are at the expense of higher socioeconomic
groups (SES 4 and 5).
From these results, there are two features worth highlighting, which are relevant to
51It is also checked for what happens when it is decreased.
52For all the simulations and counterfactual experiments, I use the same shocks for each student.
In this way, the changes in behavior are only due to changes in colleges admissions rules.
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keep in mind for the next paragraphs. First, because this is a tournament, where the
seats and “prizes” are fixed, there are winners and losers. Second, the effect of the
SES-Quota system (the one presented in this paper) is much more aggressive in how
the college selection system distributes opportunities than changing GPA weights.53
The main goal in this paper is to see how changes in students’ opportunities may
affect their behavior in high school. In this respect, Figure A.8 shows that the SES-
quota implementation increases the average effort of high school students by 0.3
standard deviations. Similarly, Figure A.9 shows that the changes in GPA weight
imply increases in students’ average effort from 0.2 to 0.8 standard deviations, de-
pending on the magnitude of the weight’s change.
Furthermore, these plots show the importance of the interaction between the two
student decisions (i.e., exerted effort and taking the PSU), in the sense that the
highest reactions in exerted effort come from those students who also change their
decision on taking the college admissions test. For instance, for those students who
were not taking the national tests in the baseline simulation, who become takers
once the GPA weight is changed, the increase in average exerted effort is from 0.5
to 0.9 standard deviations. The opposite occurs for those who pass from taking
to not taking the tests. However, even for those students who do take the college
admissions test in both scenarios, there is an important increment in average effort,
both in the SES-quota system and when the GPA weight is changed.54
Given the linear form of the tests’ production function, the effects of these changes
in admissions rules on tests is a linear function of the effect on effort. In particular,
Figure A.10 presents the numbers for the SES-quota experiment. In this case, for
those students who attend SES 1 or 2 high schools, the average PSU (math and
verbal) increases by around 0.05 standard deviations and by around 0.1 in high
53I don’t include more plots with different weights but the reader can request the results for a
broader set of weights (0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9).
54There are no changes for those who do not take the college admissions test in both scenarios.
This is by construction, given that the same shocks are used in all the simulations and counterfactual
experiments.
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school GPA. The opposite occurs for socioeconomic groups 4 and 5. In all cases,
these moderate effects more than double for those who change their PSU decision.
Finally, even though the magnitudes of these changes are small, there is an important
effect on the average final score at each university, which brings attention to the
relevance of the change that this experiment produces in the admission system.
As pointed out above, admissions rules also affect the test-taking decision, which is
natural since in my model, due to test cost, students take the national test when
they have fair chances of being admitted to a good university. Indeed, Figure A.11
shows that the implementation of SES-Quota system increases (decreases) the PSU
participation by about 5−20 percentage points for socioeconomic groups 1 and 2 (3,
4, and 5). Interestingly, for the entire population these effects cancel each other out,
which is consistent with this being a tournament, where the new admissions policy
does not change the number of seats per university. In the case of changing the GPA
weight (Figure A.12), the effect across socioeconomic groups is more moderate, in
the range of 1− 8 percentage points.
In terms of policy analysis, it is not only relevant how many students change their
behavior, but also who those students are. The empirical approach performed in this
paper allows for such an analysis. In particular, the second plot of Figure A.11 shows
that, when introducing the SES-Quota system, the new PSU-takers are noticeably
more skilled (i.e., higher learning skill type) than those who decide to abandon the
admissions process, i.e., not taking the PSU. In the case of changing GPA weights,
this result depends on the variation extent, namely, it is the same as the SES-Quota
system for new weights equal to 0.5 and 0.6 and goes in the opposite direction for
higher weights.
From the previous analysis, it is clear that effort is quite elastic to changes in college
admissions rules. However, given the estimated parameters of the tests’ production
functions, these effort reactions do not imply changes by the same magnitudes for
student performance. In other words, the estimated model requires large changes in
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college admissions rules in order to have substantial variations in high school student
performance. In this context it is pertinent to ask how relevant this is to model effort.
In this regard, I compare how the final-score cutoff and the admission of each univer-
sity would change, given the described counterfactual experiments, in two scenarios:
(1) with optimal effort (i.e., simulating the model) and (2) with fixed effort (i.e., the
effort exerted in the baseline scenario). The results plotted in Figure A.13 show that
there is an important difference between the optimal effort’s final-score cutoffs and
the fixed effort’s final-score cutoffs,55 given the implementation of the SES-Quota
system. For example, in the case of the final-score cutoffs for SES 1 and 2, the
difference between these two scenarios goes from 0.2 to more than 1.5 standard de-
viations. Moreover, only 55% of the students are admitted to the same university in
both scenarios.
Figure A.14 shows that when these two scenarios are compared given a change in
GPA weight from 0.4 to 0.5 (from 0.4 to 0.7), the differences in final-score cutoffs
change from 0.01 to 0.025 (from 0.01 to 0.025). However, even in the cases where
the effects are moderate, only 70% (50%) of the students are admitted to the same
university in both scenarios (Figure A.15). Thus, this evidence supports the idea that
modeling efforts and the decision to take the PSU is important in order to anticipate
what would happen to the main outcomes of the college admissions system.
55It should be kept in mind that such a counterfactual experiment implies 5 final-score cutoffs
per university.
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Figure 1.5: Average effort: SES-Quota versus changing GPA’s weight
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Finally, I discuss which college admissions rule leads to the most efficient student
allocation. I first simulate the estimated model for different GPA weights and calcu-
late the resulting socioeconomic composition among universities from each of these
exercises. Then, I impose these quotas in the SES-quota system. As a result, I can
compare outcomes of the two policy experiments while having the same socioeco-
nomic composition in both cases.
As Figure 1.5 shows, the first point is that changes in the GPA weight imply a higher
increase in average effort than for the SES-Quota system. This is mainly because
the estimated effort marginal productivity is much higher in the GPA production
function than in the production functions of the two PSU tests.
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Figure 1.6: Expected tests and GPA: SES-Quota versus changing GPA’s weight
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(b) GPA weight = 0.6
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(c) GPA weight = 0.7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
−0.15
−0.1
−0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
Universities
E[
tes
t|S
ES
−Q
uo
ta]
 − 
E[t
es
t|n
ew
 G
PA
 we
igh
t], 
std
 
 
PSU math
PSU verbal
GPA
(d) GPA weight = 0.8
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However, this does not mean that changing the GPA weight is the preferred system
to achieve equal opportunities. Instead, Figure 1.6 shows that the higher the GPA
weight, the larger the advantage of SES-Quota system, in terms of expected PSU
test scores and GPA of the students admitted at top universities. This result is
because, as the GPA weight increases, the GPA shock becomes more relevant in
the admissions process, while in the SES-Quota system, the same equal opportunity
achievement is reached by keeping the weights of the PSU tests and GPA constant.
Therefore the latter keeps the weights of each shock constant, which attenuates the
risk of admitting a bad student due to one extremely positive shock (the three shocks
are independent). In sum, the SES-Quota system implies, in expectation, a better
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student allocation, keeping the level of equal opportunities constant, because it is
able to achieve this goal using the existing information more efficiently.
1.8 Conclusion
To answer the question of this paper, it would be best to have data before and after
some admissions policy changes. This ideal data would make it easier to capture the
effects of admissions rules on high school student performance. In the absence of such
data, structural estimations allow for ex ante policy evaluation. Yet, even with such
data, the structural approach will be needed in order to study the effect of several
policies, as in this paper. The current paper is one of the first steps in studying the
structural relationship between high school student effort and their probabilities of
being admitted to a good university.
Given the well known difficulty in measuring effort and the level of abstraction
that the model needs to be tractable, it is valid to question the reliability of the
paper’s results. In my opinion, even though the model makes relevant abstractions
from reality in order to be tractable and estimable, the current paper can be seen
as a reasonable model of the college admissions system of Chile, with reasonable
parameters, estimated as rigorously as possible. Yet, this exercise is only capable of
giving a rough idea about what could happen if college admissions rules change.
In terms of results, the main lesson from this paper is that it is qualitatively and
quantitatively important to consider how a college admissions system may impact
high school student behavior. In particular, there are good theoretical and empirical
reasons why increasing the level of equal opportunities in college access may boost
the effort exerted by high school students. The results of this paper support that
claim. Moreover, this paper sheds some light on which admissions system could be
optimal in the sense of having an efficient student allocation conditional on delivering
the desired change in universities’ socioeconomic composition.
There are two interesting avenues for future work. In terms of the model, it would be
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an interesting, but difficult, extension to consider more than one major per university.
I can see in the data where non-mandatory PSUs (e.g., history, biology) were taken
by each student (if any). Thus it would be possible to have a better idea of what type
of major she was considering when making the test decision. This new multi-major
model will imply a specific tournament for each of these majors (with specific vector
of final-score cutoff). Given that the effort decision is a non-linear function of the
final-score cutoffs, having a better approximation to the real vector of cutoffs may
lead to a relevant improvement in the matching between the model and the data.
In terms of method, the paper exploits the interaction between theoretical and factor
analysis models. It is left to future research to formalize this analysis with some tests
to establish whether the endogenous modeled variable (high school student effort in
this case) effectively represents the latent variable.
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Chapter 2
A Dynamic Model of Elementary
School Choice
2.1 Introduction
A frequent topic in policy debates is what should be the role – if any – of market in-
centives in education provision. Given that parents’ choice is the critical mechanism
to increase school quality in a market-oriented educational system, the literature has
focused on the extent to which parents consider school quality when they make their
decisions, and how this consideration is heterogeneous across parents. To understand
parents’ school choice, and the potential heterogeneity in their preferences, one must
separate the effects of differences in their preferences, in perceptions about quality,
and in choice sets. Distinguishing these three elements is a complex task given that,
in general, these determinants of parents’ choice are not observable.
In this paper, I build and estimate a dynamic model of elementary school choice.
To this end, I use detailed Chilean administrative data for the students who entered
1st grade in 2004. As many authors have emphasized (e.g., Gallego and Hernando
(2008) and Hsieh and Urquiola (2006)), the Chilean system is probably the most
massive school choice program in the world, hence the importance of studying the
determinants of school choice in this context.
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I model elementary school choice at the end of each academic year, allowing for
parental heterogeneity along several dimensions: their ability to understand public
information about quality (standardized tests), how much they care about school
quality (measured as the school’s contribution to standardized test scores), their in-
volvement in the school attended by their child, and their choice set.56 By estimating
the structural parameters of the model, I am able to assess the empirical relevance of
these components in explaining both the observed preference for private over public
schools and the unequal access to high quality schools.
In the model, parents care about different characteristics of primary schools, such as
the school’s socioeconomic composition, quality, religious affiliation, location, type of
administration (i.e., public, subsidized private and non-subsidized private), tuition
fee, and GPA standard. Parents do not perfectly observe school quality. To estimate
the quality of each school, they can access two different sources of information. First,
every year they observe the performance of each school on a standardized test, which
is made public with a one year lag. Parents can have different levels of misperception
in processing this information; because test scores depend on school quality and on
the socioeconomic status (SES) of the school, parents can confound these two effects,
confusing high quality schools with schools that have higher SES students. Second,
parents also differ in their exogenous level of involvement in the schooling process of
their child, which implies that those who are involved in their child’s school observe
the quality of that particular school without misperception.
I estimate the parameters of the model by simulated maximum likelihood, using the
Monte Carlo integration and interpolation method (Keane and Wolpin (1994)). To
build the database of students, I use the administrative panel data from 2004 to
2011, which includes the school attended by each student in each year, their average
grade, the municipality where they live and where the school is located, and some
basic demographic information. Because the sample of students entering 1st grade
56In Chile, at least in my sample period, schools were allowed to select students based on academic
and non-academic characteristics (e.g., parents’ marital status).
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in 2004 took the SIMCE test in 4th grade (2007) and in 8th grade (2011), I merge
this panel with information from parent surveys associated with those rounds of
SIMCE administration, including mother’s and father’s information. To build the
database of schools, I use the test scores from the SIMCE test and the informa-
tion collected from SIMCE parents’ surveys for the years 2002, 2005-2011.57 Test
scores are used to estimate school quality for every year. The surveys include ques-
tions about school tuition fees, and information about the elements considered by
the school in the admission process. Furthermore, from administrative data of the
Ministry of Education, I collect information about schools’ religious affiliation, if
any.
The results show that parents do care –but in a moderate way– about school quality,
that more involved parents care marginally more about school quality, and that
parents’ decisions are not sensitive to quality after the first decision (1st grade).
Moreover, the results also suggest that parents have an important misperception
about school quality, which results in a less favorable opinion about the quality
of public schools, relative to private schools. This result supports the idea that
parents may have difficulties in isolating a school’s quality from its socioeconomic
composition when they observe test scores. However, given that quality is not very
relevant for their decision, such a misperception only partially affects parents’ choices.
Regarding the debate about why parents choose private schools over public schools,
the results show that, if parents were only concerned about quality, they would
choose public schools more often. The same would be true if they did not have a
misperception about quality. However, the results suggest that admission rules are
binding restrictions and that relaxing them would increase the demand for private
schools. The simulations also show that schools’ admission rules and household
location are both important in explaining the rise in the achievement gap between
students from different SES.
574th grade SIMCE for years 2002, 2005-2009 and 8th grade SIMCE for years 2004, 2007, 2009
and 2011.
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The paper has three main contributions. First, to the best of my knowledge, this
is the first paper that structurally estimates a dynamic model of elementary school
choice. The dynamic nature of school choice has particular relevance in the Chilean
context, where around 30% of the students switch schools at least once between 1st
and 8th grade (excluding those who moved to other municipalities and those who fail
at least one year). Second, the structural approach followed in this paper allows me
to quantify different causes of unequal access to high quality schools and of the higher
demand for private schools than for public schools. Finally, the model considers the
difficulties that parents may have in processing and understanding information about
school quality, which contributes to the scarce literature on structural estimation
with bounded rationality, as well as to the literature that uses observed choices to
infer agents’ information.
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2.2 presents a review of the related
literature; Section 2.3 briefly describes the Chilean educational system; Section 2.4
introduces the model; Section 2.5 discusses the data and the procedure to estimate
the model; and Section 2.6 presents the results and the analysis of the counterfactual
experiments. Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Literature Review
This paper is related to several strands in the literature. First of all, it is related to the
papers that evaluate the role of competitive market incentives in education provision.
On one side, there are theoretical papers, such as Epple and Romano (1998), and
McMillan (2004), which debate the potential for those incentives, specifically tuition
vouchers, to increase schools’ quality and to make significant improvements for poor
families.58 On the other side, there are empirical studies that show mixed evidence
58In a survey of this literature, Epple and Romano (2012) conclude: Research taking account of
distinctive features of the education“market” has shown that early arguments touting the virtues
of laissez-faire flat-rate vouchers were overly optimistic. However, the research does not vindi-
cate voucher opponents who use shortcomings of the laissez-faire voucher to justify the wholesale
dismissal of vouchers.
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regarding this debate; see, for example, Hsieh and Urquiola (2006), and Angrist,
Bettinger, and Kremer (2006).59
Authors have studied the determinants of parents’ school choice because this is one
of the important mechanisms that could explain the shortcomings in the implemen-
tation of market-oriented policies in education. In particular, they have studied
whether and to what extent parents consider school quality when they make their
choice.60 For instance, in an interesting paper, Hastings and Weinstein (2008) used a
natural experiment and a field experiment that provided direct information on school
test scores to lower-income families in a public school choice plan, finding a signifi-
cant increase in the probability that those families would choose higher-performing
schools. In an alternative strategy, several studies have focused on estimating the
value that parents place on school quality by calculating how much more people pay
for houses located in areas with better schools (e.g., Black (1999) and Kane, Riegg,
and Staiger (2006)).
One caveat about this literature is that, in general, it measures school quality using
average school test scores. The problem with this approach is that, from the point
of view of the parents, this average is not relevant; what is relevant is what their
child’s performance would be if she were to attend a particular school. Given that
sorting is a common feature in education, these two conditional expectations should
not coincide. Exceptions to this general problem are shown in Mizala and Urquiola
(2013), Neilson (2013), and Rothstein (2006). For instance, Mizala and Urquiola
(2013) use a sharp regression discontinuity to estimate the effect that being identified
as a SNED winner (a program which seeks to identify effective schools, controlling
for schools’ SES) has on schools’ enrollment, finding no consistent evidence that
winning a SNED award affects this outcome.61
59Bettinger (2011) reviews the cases of Chile, Colombia, and Sweden, emphasizing the context-
specific nature of the results.
60See for example Alderman, Orazem, and Paterno (2001), and Bast and Walberg (2004).
61Mizala, Romaguera, and Urquiola (2007) present evidence indicating that, in the case of Chile,
once we control for the students’ socioeconomic status, the remaining part of the test scores are
very volatile from year to year. Hence, they argue that producing a meaningful ranking of schools
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Several authors study the determinants of school choice in the Chilean context.62
For instance, Gallego and Hernando (2008), using a semi-structural approach, find
results that suggest that the school choice implemented in Chile increased overall
student welfare, but they also find that there is a lot of heterogeneity in the size
and even the sign of the welfare change. Along the same lines, Chumacero, Go´mez,
and Paredes (2011), using a database that accurately estimates the distance between
the household and school, find that both quality and distance are highly valued by
households. In a recent and novel paper, Neilson (2013) study the effects of targeted
school vouchers on the outcomes of poor children in Chile; his findings suggest that
this program effectively raised competition in poor neighborhoods, pushing schools
to improve their academic quality. Finally, Mark, Elacqua, and Buckley (2006) study
how parents construct their school choice sets and comparing this to what they say
they are seeking in choosing schools. Their results indicate that parental decisions
are influenced by demographics.63
This paper is also related to the literature that models individuals’ economic decisions
incorporating bounded rationality. In general, this literature follows the idea that,
as Simon (1986) points out, cognitive effort is a scarce resource, and the knowledge
and computational power of the decision-maker are always limited. In an interest-
ing paper, which is one of the few papers that perform a structural estimation with
bounded rationality, Houser, Keane, and McCabe (2004) develop a Bayesian pro-
cedure for classification of subjects into decision rule types in choice experiments,
finding that, in a very difficult dynamic problem, more than a third of the experimen-
tal subjects followed a rule very close to the optimal (expected wealth maximizing)
rule.
that may inform parents and policymakers may be harder than is commonly assumed.
62Chile’s school choice policies will be described in the next section.
63There are several studies that try to study the effect of the voucher system implementation
in Chile. Although the evidence is mixed regarding its effect on school quality, there is more
agreement on the negative effect of this policy on student socioeconomic segregation (Auguste and
Valenzuela (2006); Gauri (1999); and Hsieh and Urquiola (2006)). In a different approach, Bravo,
Mukhopadhyay, and Todd (2010) find that educational vouchers increased educational attainment,
high school graduation, college attendance and graduation, and wages.
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Because school choice is a complex task, which involves gathering and processing
information, different authors have studied the presence of bounded rationality in
that context. For instance, Schneider, Teske, Marshall, and Roch (1998) find that,
on average, low-income parents have very little accurate information about objective
conditions in the schools.64 However, even though levels of objective information
held by parents are low, their actual choice of schools reflects their preferences in
education. Along the same lines, Azmat and Garcia-Montalvo (2012) conclude that,
as well as parents’ education, information gathering and information processing are
important determinants for the quality of school choice.
Finally, this paper is also related to the literature that attempts to infer agents’
information using observed choices, such as: Carneiro, Hansen, and Heckman (2003);
Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro (2005); and Navarro (2011).
2.3 The Chilean Educational System
In 1981, the Chilean military government created a voucher market in the educational
system, which was part of a broader reform that also included the decentralization
of public schools (which were transferred to municipalities) and the introduction of
flexibility in teachers’ contracts.65 This reform transformed the way schools were
funded by the government, establishing a system where private and public schools
were paid per student, with a flat voucher, on the basis of attendance.
Since then, the allocation of public resources has been mainly determined by parents’
decisions. However, in practice, this decision has had several restrictions: schools can
select students based on their previous performance, tests, and the characteristics of
their parents (e.g., marital status and religion). On top of that, since 1994, when
a co-payment law was passed, schools that are eligible for public funding can also
charge a tuition fee; in that case, depending on the amount charged, there is a
64The same is found by Henig (1996).
65For a summary of these reforms, see Gauri (1999) and Mizala and Romaguera (2000).
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discount to the school’s subsidy.66
This reform consolidated a system of mixed provision of education, with three types
of schools; municipal (public), private subsidized (voucher-private), and entirely pri-
vate (non voucher-private). The first two receive most of their funds from state
vouchers, and, since 1994, privately subsidized schools may additionally charge a
tuition fee. In 2013, over 90% of the Chilean students attending public and private
schools received funding via vouchers.67
In order to guide parents’ decisions and to measure the student learning process, a
new testing system, SIMCE, came into existence in 1988. The SIMCE is an annual
nationwide standardized test. Its results have been public information for more than
two decades, publicized in part by listings in major newspapers of individual schools’
performance. The government also uses SIMCE scores to allocate resources.68
More than 30 years after the reform, there are several clear stylized facts. First, there
has been a massive migration from public to private schools. Indeed, the student
fraction in the public system went from 78%, in 1981, to 38% in 2012.69 Secondly,
enrollment in voucher-private schools was accelerated after passage of the co-payment
law.70 Thirdly, the magnitude of socioeconomic school segregation is very high (and
higher than the geographical segregation), and has increased slightly over the last
decade (Valenzuela, Bellei, and Rı´os (2014)). Finally, despite important increases
in the public budget allocated to education, Chile’s performance is relatively poor
when compared with similar countries (Chumacero, Go´mez, and Paredes (2011)).
Another salient feature of the Chilean system, which is consistent with its “free
66Epple and Romano (2008) emphasize the consequences of this selection mechanism for the
outcomes of an educational voucher system.
67Source: Ministry of Education, Chile.
68Meckes and Carrasco (2010) describe SIMCE’s main features, purposes, institutional frame-
work, and strategies for communicating results.
69There is a debate, and mixed evidence, about whether voucher private schools have higher
quality than public schools. In a meta-analysis, Drago and Paredes (2011) find that voucher-
private schools have a small advantage over public schools. On the contrary, Bellei (2009) finds
that voucher-private schools are no more effective than public schools, and that they may be less
effective.
70See Larran˜aga (2004).
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choice” design, is that a fairly large number of parents switch schools at some point
during primary school. In this regard, Table B.2 of the Appendix B.1 shows that,
in any grade, around 4-7% of the parents change their child’s school, and that more
educated parents are more likely to do so.71 Moreover, Table B.1 of the Appendix
B.1 shows that more than 30% of parents changed their child’s school at least one
time during primary school.72
2.4 The Model
I consider a model in which each family i ∈ {1, 2, ..., I} decides among their possible
elementary school alternatives in each of T (finite) discrete periods of time, where T
is the end of the elementary cycle. The educational market is composed of J schools.
The parents’ decision is restricted in two ways. First, each parent i, has a specific
choice set Λi ⊆ {1, 2, ..., J}. The cardinality of Λi is denoted by S(Λi). Second,
each school j ∈ Λi may or may not admit the student i based on a rule that will be
described below.
Parents’ Utility
Let Dit ∈ Λi be the school chosen by parent i at time t. The flow utility of parents
i when their child is attending school j at time t is given by:
uijt = βkiKijt + βyYjt + βzZij + βgGijt + C 1(Dit−1 6= j) + βeg[Gijt−1 − Ĝijt−1]
1(Dit−1 = j) + ǫ
u
ijt
where Kijt is the knowledge achieved by student i in school j at time t (j can
be different across years), Yjt is a vector of characteristics of the school j (e.g.
71These figures do not include parents who change the municipality where they live, or students
who repeat a grade. If one considers those cases, this fraction rises to around 11% (Zamora (2011)).
72These levels of student mobility are similar to what is observed in other countries. For instance,
Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin (2004) show that, in Texas’ public schools, one-third of all children
switch schools at least once between grades 4 and 7, excluding changes due to the transition from
elementary to middle school.
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socioeconomic composition and price), Zij is a measure of the distance between the
attributes of school j and the tastes of individual i (e.g., religion and location), Gijt
is the GPA obtained by the student, C is the direct cost of changing school, 1(A)
is a function that takes 1 when A is true, Ĝijt−1 is the expected GPA given the
information at t− 2, and ǫuijt is an iid shock.
In the final period, there is a utility that also captures all future payoffs, such that
uijT = β
T
KiKijT + βyYjT + βzZij + C 1(DiT−1 6= j) + βeg[GijT−1 − ĜijT−1]
1(DiT−1 = j) + β
T
s SECj + β
T
agGijT + β
T
taTAiT + ǫ
u
ijT ,
where TAit represents the time, in years, that student i has been attending the
current school and SEKj takes one when school j also offers secondary level grades
(from 9th to 12th) and zero otherwise. Including the latter in the terminal utility
captures the changing costs that parents are forced to incur in T +1 when their child
attends a school that does not offer the secondary class level. Furthermore, GijT and
TAiT are included because, as will be noted, they determine the future chances of
being admitted in the desired high school.
Student knowledge
I model student knowledge as a cumulative process. In particular, let qjt be the
quality of school j at time t and qijt the quality of the school attended by student i
at time t, such that qijt =
∑J
j=1 qjt1(Dit = j); thus, the learning process is given by:
Ki0 = α0Xi,
Kijt = Kijt−1 + α1qijt.
Therefore, the knowledge achieved by student i in school j at time t, Kijt, is a func-
tion of student i’s previous knowledge and the quality of the school she attends that
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year, qijt. In addition, the initial knowledge only depends on student i’s characteris-
tics Xi (i.e., parents’ education).
GPA function
Grades in elementary school are determined by the following production function:
Gijt = λ
t
0jt + λ
t
1jtKijt + λ
t
2TAit + ε
g
ijt,
This specification captures the idea that each school may have a particular way to
map knowledge onto grades. In particular, the higher the value of λ0jt, the more
likely it is that students perform well in school j. Moreover, even conditioning on
student knowledge, TAit has an effect on grades. This accounts for the fact that it
may take time for new students to learn the characteristics of the evaluation system
of each school.
Probability of admittance
Parents are restricted in their choices to the extent that schools have the right of
admittance. Let ADijt be a binary variable, which is unobservable for the econome-
trician, that equals one if student i can enter school j at time t and zero otherwise,
such that:
ADijt =
 1 if ̺ijt − εadijt ≥ 00 if ̺ijt − εadijt < 0
where
̺ijt = ϕ0 + ϕqqjtSeljt + ϕ0kSel
k
jt + ϕ1kKit−1Sel
k
jt + ϕ0gSel
g
jt + ϕ1gGit−1Sel
g
jt
+ ϕ0mrSel
m
jt + ϕ1mrMRijt−1Sel
m
jt + ϕ0rSel
r
jt + ϕ1rRELiSel
r
jt + ϕsSel
o
jt
+ ϕ0nsNewjt + ϕ1nsNewjt ∗ Sizejt + ϕfeXi ∗ feejt + ϕsxXi ∗ Seljt.
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and Selkjt takes one when school j selects students based on academic tests and
zero otherwise; Selgjt takes one when school j selects students based on previous
grades and zero otherwise; Selrjt takes one when school j selects students based on
students’ religion and zero otherwise; takes one when school j selects students based
on parents’ marital status and zero otherwise Selmjt ; Sel
o
jt takes one when school j
selects students based on other reasons and zero otherwise.73 These variables may
all equal one at the same time.74 Newjt takes one when the school is new (or doesn’t
offer the previous grades), Sizejt is the size of this new school, and feejt denotes the
tuition fee. Finally, MRijt takes one if parents are married and zero otherwise, and
RELi takes one if parents are religious and zero otherwise.
75
Then, assuming that εadijt are iid, following a logistic distribution, the probability of
admission is described by:
Pr(ADijt = 1) =
exp(̺ijt)
1 + exp(̺ijt)
To have a tractable likelihood calculation, I assume that εadijt is realized before parents
make the Dit decision.
76 Moreover, to simplify the solution of the model, I assume
that, for any student, there is always at least one school willing to admit her. In
particular,
h ∈ argmaxj∈Λi(̺ijt) ⇒ ADiht = 1.
I chose this specification for the random process of ADijt for two reasons: given
the rich information that I have about the admission rules of each school it seems
73In the empirical implementation, all these variables are proportions, instead of binary variables.
This is because I construct these variables from parents’ surveys, and in each school their answers
are not always the same. Thus, for instance, in the empirical implementation, Selkjt is the fraction
of parents in school j who affirm that school j selects students based on an academic test.
74Seljt is an index to measure how selective is school j at time t. In the empirical implementation
of this model, Seljt = (Sel
k
jt + Sel
g
jt + Sel
o
jt) ∗
1
3 .
75Contreras, Sepulveda, and Bustos (2010) present evidence indicating that student selection is
a widespread practice among private subsidized schools.
76This means parents do not apply to schools. Instead, at the end of each period they know their
feasible set for the next period and they pick the feasible school that maximizes their expected
utility.
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reasonable to, and considering the challenge in separately identifying the parameters
of this process and the parameters of the utility function when ADijt is latent. In
this regard, it should be noted that there is no variable that enters in the same way
in the admission probability function and in the utility function.77
Moreover, this specification takes advantage of the interaction between the features
of the model and data availability. For instance, if the school selects students based
on an academic test (with ϕ1k > 0, as expected), then the higher Kit−1, the higher
the probability of i being admitted at j.
Parents’ information and perception about quality
Parents have two sources of information about school quality. Firstly, they observe
the results of the standardized tests for all the schools, which is public information.
Secondly, they may observe the quality of the school which their child is attending,
which is private information.
Regarding public information, it is assumed that standardized tests are measures of
school quality, whose values also depend on the characteristics of the student. Thus,
in this model, school quality is defined as a school’s contribution to learning (i.e.,
value added), such that:
STmijt = qjt + θ
m
2 Xi + ε
m
ijt,
ST sijt = θ
s
0 + θ
s
1qjt + θ
s
2Xi + ε
s
ijt,
ST nijt = θ
n
0 + θ
n
1 qjt + θ
n
2Xi + ε
n
ijt,
ST scijt = θ
s
0 + θ
s
1qjt + θ
sc
2 Xi + ε
sc
ijt,
where STmijt denotes the math test score, where s is for Spanish, n for natural science,
and sc for social science. I define q˜jt as the estimation of the expected quality of
school j at time t, given the public information STjt, such that: q˜jt = ̂E[qjt|STjt, X ].
77The few variables that are in both functions are interacting with other variables in the function
that determine the probability of admission.
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The model is flexible in terms of how parents access and understand the information
about schools’ quality. In the first place, there are different types of parents with
regard to their ability to distinguish the school’s contribution from the students’ con-
tribution to test scores. In the second place, there are different types of parents with
regard to their involvement in the schooling process of their child, which determines
whether they observe the quality of that school. Namely, only involved parents have
access to private information. The first is denoted parent’s cognitive skill, whereas
the second is denoted parent’s school involvement. The school involvement type of
parent i is given by ψi ∈ {0, 1}, where 1 means involved.
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To present how parents access and understand the information about the quality of
schools, I divide the analysis into three cases: (1) their perception about the quality
of the schools not attended by their child; (2) the involved parents’ perception about
the quality of the school attended by their child; and (3) the non-involved parent’s
perception about the quality of the school attended by their child. In all three cases,
what matters is parents’ perception at the end of t−1 (when they make the choice of
school for period t), about school quality at time t, given their information at time
t− 1, i.e. Et−1[qjt|Dit−1, ψi].
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Case 1: Schools not attended by their child.
Et−1[qjt|Dit−1 6= j] = q˜jt−2 +
∑
χ∈A
ηiχ(ST
χ
jt−2 − θ
χ
0,t−2 − θ
χ
1,t−2qjt−2),
where, ηiχ = η
1
1,χXi+ η2,χS(Λi) and A = {m, s, n, sc}. Thus, η depends on parents’
education and the size of the choice set (S(Λi)), where the latter is motivated by the
bounded rationality literature.80
In this case, if – as expected – ηiχ ≥ 0, then parents will overestimate the quality for
78This is an exogenous, time invariant, parents’ characteristic and therefore it does not depend
on the school’s characteristic.
79In all these cases, they use their current estimation of quality as their prediction for future
values.
80A survey in Conlisk (1996).
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schools whose students have, on average, highly educated parents.81 Moreover, given
the fact that in the Chilean educational system standardized tests are published one
year after taken, even if parents did not have a misperception about quality (i.e.,
η = 0), when they choose the school for time t (at the end of t − 1), they would
estimate school qualities using the public information at t− 2.
In sum, the use of public information presents two potential drawbacks: it is pub-
lished after a delay, and parents may have difficulties in interpreting it, namely, when
they observe the tests, they can have problems in isolating school quality from the
socioeconomic composition of its students.
Case 2: School attended by their child, when parents are involved in that school
(ψi = 1).
82
Et−1[qjt|Dit−1 = j, ψi = 1] = qjt−1
Thus, parents who are involved in their child’s school observe the quality of that
school without distortion and without lag.83
Case 3: School attended by their child, when parents are not involved in that school
(ψi = 0).
Et−1[qjt|Dit−1 = j, ψi = 0] = q˜jt−2 +
∑
χ∈A
ηiχ(ST
χ
jt−2 − θ
χ
0,t−2 − θ
χ
1,t−2qjt−2),
A = {m, s, n, sc}.
Thus, parents who are not involved in their child’s school have, for that school, the
same information that they have for all the other schools (public information).
81Given the functional form of the standardized tests, ST
χ
jt−2 − θ
χ
0,t−2 − θ
χ
1,t−2q˜jt−2 is the part
of the average test, of subject χ, that is not explained by school quality. Hence, this is the part
explained by the socioeconomic composition of the school.
82I allow for βki being different for this type of parent.
83This assumption is supported by the evidence presented in Azmat and Garcia-Montalvo (2012),
who find that knowing about and/or visiting more schools is related to more accurately assessing
local schools.
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In this context, parents’ perception about their child’s knowledge is given by the
following expressions:
• E0[Ki0|ψi] = Ki0.
• Et[Kit|Dit, ψi] = Et[Kit−1|Dit, ψi] + α1
∑J
j=1Et[qjt|Dit, ψi]1(Dit = j).
• Et−1[Kit|Dit−1, ψi] = Et−1[Kit−1|Dit−1, ψi] + α1
∑J
j=1Et−1[qjt|Dit−1, ψi]1(Dit =
j).
I denote K˜ait = Ea[Kit|Dia, ψi], a = {t− 1, t}.
Decision Timing and Solution of the Model
At the end of period t − 1, the following random variables are realized: (1) Utility
idiosyncratic shocks: ǫuijt ∀i, j; (2) the right of admittance shocks: ε
ad
ijt (hence, ADijt)
∀i, j; and (3) test scores, published with lag: {STmt−2,ST
l
t−2,ST
n
t−2,ST
sc
t−2}. Given
this information, parents decide Dit, taking into consideration the expected flow
utility at t and the expected future payoff associated with each school.84
The model is solved by backward recursion, where the dynamic decision is driven by
the state variables (Ωit).
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Ωit =

{Dit, TAit, K˜
t
ijt, Gijt, qijt,STt−1, ε
ad
it
, ǫu
it
} if ψi = 1
{Dit, TAit, K˜
t
ijt, Gijt,STt−1, ε
ad
it
, ǫu
it
} if ψi = 0
I define Ω−it as the state variables which are observed by the econometrician, such
that:86
Ω−it =

{Dit, TAit, K˜
t
ijt, Git, qijt,STt−1} if ψi = 1
{Dit, TAit, K˜
t
ijt, Git,STt−1} if ψi = 0
84ε
g
ijt is realized after the decision of Dit is made.
85TAit = 1 + 1(Dit = Dit−1)TAit−1 and Gijt =
Gijt−1∗(t−1)+Gijt
t
.
86Observed conditional on types.
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To consider the school’s right of admittance, I redefine the flow utility as:
u¯ijt = u˜ijt(ǫ
ad
ijt) + ǫ
u
ijt
where,
u˜ijt(ǫ
ad
ijt) =

βkKijt + βxYjt + βzZij
+βgGijt + C1(Dit−1 6= j)
+βeg[Gijt−1 − Ĝijt−1]1(Dit−1 = j) if ADijt(Ω
−
it−1, ǫ
ad
ijt) = 1
−∞ if ADijt(Ω
−
it−1, ǫ
ad
ijt) = 0
The solution to this dynamic problem is fully characterized by the integrated value
function, V (Ω−it−1), such that:
87
V (Ω−it−1) =
∫
max
j∈Λi
{
Et−1u˜ijt(ǫ
ad
ijt) + ǫ
u
ijt + δEt−1[V (Ω
−
it)|Ω
−
it−1, Dit = j]
}
dGε(εit),
εit = [ǫ
u
it ǫ
ad
it ]
′.
Then, defining the auxiliary function v(Ωit−1, Dit = h) as:
v(Ωit−1, Dit = h) = Et−1u˜iht(ǫ
ad
it ) + ǫ
u
iht + δEt−1[V (Ω
−
it)|Ω
−
it−1, Dit = h]
⇒ Dit ∈ argmaxj∈Λi {v(Ωit−1, Dit = j)} ∀t ∈ {1, 2, ..., T − 1}
At the end of T − 1:
87
ǫ
u
it = {ǫ
u
ijt}j∈Λi and ǫ
ad
it = {ǫ
ad
ijt}j∈Λi .
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u˜ijT (ǫ
ad
ijT ) =

βKKijT + βxYjT + βzZij + β
T
taTAiT
+βeg[GijT−1 −GijT−1]1(DiT−1 = j)
+C 1(DiT−1 6= j) + β
T
s SECj + β
T
agGijT if ADijt(Ω
−
iT−1, ǫ
ad
ijT ) = 1
−∞ if ADijt(Ω
−
iT−1, ǫ
ad
ijT ) = 0
v(ΩiT−1, DiT = j) = ET−1u˜ijT (ǫ
ad
iT ) + ǫ
u
ijT ,
⇒ DiT ∈ argmaxj∈Λi {v(ΩiT−1, DiT = j)} .
2.5 Data and Empirical Implementation
Data Description
The main source of information in this paper is the administrative panel data from
2004 to 2011 on all students in the country from the Ministry of Education of the
government of Chile. This panel includes the school attended every year, the average
grade, the municipality where the student lives and where the school is located, and
some basic demographic information. As mentioned, the sample of students entering
1st grade in 2004 took the SIMCE test in 4th grade (2007) and 8th grade (2011),
and I merge this panel with information from parent surveys that are carried out
during the SIMCE process. These contain mother’s and father’s education, whether
they care about school religion, and their marital status.
In order to characterize schools, I use SIMCE test scores and the information col-
lected from SIMCE parents’ surveys for the years 2002, 2005-2011.88 Test scores are
used to estimate schools’ quality for every year. The surveys include questions about
884th grade SIMCE for years 2002, 2005-2009 and 8th grade SIMCE for years 2004, 2007, 2009
and 2011.
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school tuition fees, and whether the school considered some of the following elements
in the admission process: a student test, previous GPA, parents’ marital status (and
whether they had a religious wedding), and a general category to account for any
other information considered in the admission. Furthermore, from administrative
data of the Ministry of Education, I collect information about each school’s religious
affiliation.
Finally, from the SIMCE of 2011, 8th grade for my cohort, I use the answers to two
types of questions as determinants of parent involvement. First, I use the questions
to parents:
1. How often do you attend the periodic parents’ meeting of your child’s class?
2. Name the first three reasons why you chose your child’s current school.
Second, I use the questions to students, How often does one of your parents do each
of the following activities? :
1. She or he explains to me the class material that I don’t understand.
2. She or he helps me to study.
Empirical Implementation
Two inputs are needed to estimate the model, namely, the measures of school quality
and parents’ choice set. Moreover, to gain in speed, and given the detailed infor-
mation that I have, I estimate the parameters of the knowledge production function
and the parameters of the grade production function outside of the model.
Estimating Measures of Quality
As presented above, the observable test scores have the following functional form:
ST
χ
ijt = θ
χ
0 + θ
s
1qjt + θ
χ
2Xi + ε
χ
ijt, χ ∈ {m, s, n, sc}.
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I estimate the factor loadings (θ) and the distribution of qjt by EM algorithm, as-
suming that the latter follows a mixture of normal distributions:89
p(qjt) =
3∑
l=1
πlN(µ
l
jt, σ
l
jt).
Then, E[qjt|STjt, X ] is estimated as
∑3
l=1 πˆlµˆ
l
jt.
90 Figure B.2 (Appendix B.2), shows
the distribution of estimated school quality by school type in 2003, which is consistent
with Bellei (2009), in the sense that, when one does not control for peer effects,
voucher-private schools have higher quality than public schools. Because I want to
understand parents’ decisions and to what extent they base such decisions on school
quality, it makes sense to consider peer effects as part of the definition of school
quality.91
To estimate the parameters of the knowledge production function, I run the following
OLS regression:92
K˜ijT = α0Xi + α1
T∑
t=1
q˜ijt + ϑijT
Parents’ Choice Set
Given that, in principle, parents may choose any school in the country, it is a hard
empirical problem to define the choice set Λit. To do so, I classify families in G
groups, grouped by their home location (municipality) and their level of education,
then:
89In this estimation I only use students who have attended the same school during the first four
years of primary school. Xi is a vector or parents education. In the estimation, I allow that µ
l
jt
and σljt depend on school characteristic.
90Test scores are available in 4th grade at the elementary school level, and in 8th and 10th grade
in alternating years. This precludes including student fixed effects to estimate the school quality
in every year of my sample.
91However, this should be kept in mind in the analysis of the counterfactual experiments.
92Where, in a similar fashion as in the estimation of E[qjt|STjt], KijT is estimated by EM
algorithm, assuming that KijT is a latent variable measured by the SIMCE tests at time T. Further,
q˜ijt =
∑3
l=1 πˆlµˆ
l
jt.
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Gg = {i, s.t. (edi, loci) = (edg, locg)},
g(i)⇔ i ∈ Gg.
Λit = {j, s.t. ∃ i
′ ∈ Gg(i) |
T∑
t=0
1(Di′t = j) > 0}
This means that, by definition, for each pair of parents, the chosen school belongs
to their choice set.
Having a large number of families belonging to each group implies that, if no family
belonging to group Gg has chosen a particular school, it is because that school is not
feasible for that group of families. Figure B.1 (Appendix B.2) shows the distribution
of the size of parents’ choice set, which indicates that, if anything, this approach is
overestimating that size.
Estimating the Parameters of the Grade Production Function
To estimate the parameters in the grade production function, λ0jt and λ1j ∀j, t, I
use the math test to replace Kijt by ST
m
ijt − ε
m
ijT in the grade production function,
such that:
Gijt = λ0jt + λ1jtST
m
ijt + λ2tTAijt − λ1jε
m
ijT + ε
g
ijt
Then, I estimate the parameters of interest by Two Stage Least Squares, using ST lijt,
ST nijt and ST
c
ijt as instruments of ST
m
ijt.
Estimating the Parameters of the Utility Function
The specification of the utility function includes (in vector Yj) school socioeconomic
composition dummies, tuition fee, school type dummies (public, voucher-private,
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and non voucher-private);93 (in vector Zj) a dummy variable that takes one if both
the school and parents are religious and zero otherwise, and a dummy variable that
takes one if parents live in the municipality where the school is located and zero
otherwise.
I estimate the parameters of the utility function by simulated maximum likelihood,
using the Monte Carlo integration and interpolation method (Keane and Wolpin
(1994)).94 Given that this –and any method that solves the dynamic problem in
each parameter iteration– is time consuming, I select a sample in the following way:
I sort the municipalities belonging to Santiago City in descending order, in terms
of their total student population, and I use the students living in the municipalities
ranked 1, 3, 5 (odd numbers) ..., 19.95 As a result, the final sample for the estimation
has 9, 752 families and 856 schools.96
Given the solution to the dynamic problem, which is fully characterized by the
integrated value function V (Ω−it−1), and assuming that ǫ
u
ijt is iid, following a standard
type-1 extreme value distribution, then:
P (Dit = h|ǫ
ad
it , ψi) =
exp(Et−1[u˜iht(ǫ
ad
iht) + δV¯ (Ω
−
it)|Ω
−
it−1, Dit = h, ψi])ADiht(Ω
−
it−1, ǫ
ad
iht)∑
j∈Λi
exp(Et−1[u˜ijt(ǫadijt) + δV¯ (Ω
−
it)|Ω
−
it−1, Dit = j, ψi])ADijt(Ω
−
it−1, ǫ
ad
ijt)
.
Therefore, the probability of a sequence of schools chosen by parents i, Di, is given
by:97
93Because the public system has two types of schools, one from 1st to 6th and the other one from
7th to 12th, in the case of public schools, I allow for a different dummy for each type.
94The discount parameter δ is not estimated, but it is assumed equal to 0.95.
95The considered municipalities are Estacio´n Central, Huechuraba, La Granja, La Reina, Macul,
Melipilla, Pedro Aguirre Cerda, Recoleta, San Miguel, and N˜un˜oa. I used 10 of the 33 municipalities
of Santiago city.
96I also drop the students who fail a year and those who change the municipalities where they
live. The former is because I use the student information collected in the 2011 SIMCE (8th grade),
information that is obviously missing for those who enter 1st grade in 2004 and fail at least one year
between 2004 and 2010. The latter is because the dynamic problem is solved for each student type,
where a type is defined by the student location, among other things. Therefore, if I considered people
who change their location, I would have to solve the dynamic problem for all the combinations of
locations observed in the data, which would dramatically increase the estimation time.
97πin = P (ψi = n|Xi).
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P (Di) =
T∏
t=1
P (Dit) =
∑
n∈{0,1}
πin
∫ T∑
t=1
P (Dit|ǫ
ad
it , ψi = n)dGεǫ
ad
it .
where the log-likelihood function L, is given by:98
L =
I∑
i=1
log(P (Di)).
Given that ADijt is a latent variable, I approximate P (Dit) by:
P (Dit = h) ≈∑
n∈{0,1}
πin
1
Ns
Ns∑
κ=1
exp(Et−1[u˜iht(ǫ
ad
iht) + δV¯ (Ω
−
it)|Ω
−
it−1, Dit = h, ψi = n])AD
κ
iht∑
j∈Λi
exp(Et−1[u˜ijt(ǫ
ad
ijt) + δV¯ (Ω
−
it)|Ω
−
it−1, Dit = j, ψi = n])AD
κ
ijt
.
where Ns is the number of simulations and the values of AD
κ
ijt are drawn from Gε.
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Identification
The identification of this model faces two challenges not commonly present in any
standard discrete choice dynamic programming models of individual behavior.100
First, there is a challenge in separately identifying the parameters of the utility
function and the parameters of the admission probabilities, without observing par-
ents’ applications. Second, there is a challenge in identifying the parameters that
determine parents’ perception about quality (i.e., η).
The former challenge is overcome through exclusion restrictions, which are naturally
developed given the available data and the features of the model. Specifically, there is
no variable (nor interaction of variables) that is simultaneously present in the utility
function and in the admission probability function. For instance, parents care about
98Because each likelihood calculation takes around 5 minutes, I use HOPSPACK (Hybrid Op-
timization Parallel Search PACKage) to optimize the likelihood function. This program is a
derivative-free optimization solver.
99In the estimation, I consider 50 simulations for each individual-time data point.
100For a survey, see Aguirregabiria and Mira (2010), Eckstein and Wolpin (1989) or Rust (1994).
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school quality through its effect on student knowledge, a variable that also enters in
the admission probability function. However, the admission probability is affected
by student knowledge only for schools that select students based on academic tests.
Furthermore, given the limitation that the model imposes on the heterogeneity of
parents’ preferences for quality, the fact that parents do not choose some schools
that would give them higher utilities is rationalized by the model as if those schools
did not admit such a student.101
The intuition behind the solution for the latter challenge is the following: if those
parents who choose schools, not for the estimated quality, but for their average test
scores (which is also determined by the socioeconomic composition of the school)
have a higher probability of belonging to a particular education group or live in
higher proportions in municipalities with a particular pattern in terms of the choice
set size, then one can use those correlations to identify the parameters that deter-
mine η. Technically speaking, given the fact that the socioeconomic composition
of schools enters directly in the utility function, the parameters of ηi are identified
given the variation than comes from the interaction – in the utility function – of
the socioeconomic composition of the school and the socioeconomic composition of
parents i.102
2.6 Results
In the Appendix B.2, I show the estimated parameters of the knowledge production
function and the production function of grades. In short, almost all the signs are
as expected and the magnitudes are, in around two third of the cases, statistically
significant. An interesting result, presented in Table B.5, is that, even controlling
for student knowledge, the number of years a student stayed in a particular school
101This is what identified the constant of the admission probability function. Another possible
approach could be the one developed by Geyer and Sieg (2013).
102The difference between test scores and quality is, on average, equal to the contribution of the
school’s SES to test scores.
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positively impacts grades which, in practice, constitutes a heterogeneous switching
cost. Moreover, Figure B.3 shows how schools have different standards by which
they evaluate their students.103
The estimation of the parameters of the utility function are shown in Appendix
B.2 (Tables B.6-B.9), where most of them have the expected sign. A noteworthy
outcome of this estimation is that parents who are involved in their child’s school
care more about school quality, i.e., they have a higher parameter βk. Yet, given the
non-linear relationship between the parameters and parents’ decision, the best way
to assess the relevance of parameter magnitudes is through model fit analysis and
counterfactual experiments.
Model Fit
I present the fit of the model under two scenarios. In the first case, I consider the
sample used for the estimation. In the second case, whose figures are presented in
Appendix B.3, I use the complete sample (all the students in Santiago City).104 I
discuss the fit of the model under these two scenarios, since these are also the two
samples that I consider in the counterfactual experiments, and because showing that
the fit is similar in the two cases reinforces the point that the model is capturing the
main mechanisms that determine parent decision, without overfitting the data.
As Figure 2.1 shows, the simulation of the model overall fits the pattern of the
students who switch school by grade. However, the model has difficulty in generating
the increase in school switching that occurs at the end of 6th grade. This increase
is mainly driven by the entry of new public schools in 7th grade (for the new cycle),
something that the model can only partially generate. Moreover, as Figure 2.2 shows,
the model does a good job of predicting the 8-year total school changes, by parents
103In this context, an easy school is one where the constant is big and the slope is small, hence
all the students have good grades and their achieved knowledge has an irrelevant impact on their
performance.
104In Appendix B.1, Table B.3 shows descriptive statistics for these two samples.
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education.105
Figure 2.1: Fraction of students changing their school by grade
2nd 3th 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
Grade
 
 
Data
Simulation
Figure 2.2: Average total change by parents education
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Given the kind of counterfactual experiments that I perform, it is relevant to assess
how the model fits the data with regard to some patterns of the decision of parents.
105In the estimation and in the simulation, I collapse the information of parents’ education into
three categories: (1) both parents did not complete secondary education (low education); (2) One
of the parents completed secondary education, but both parents did not attend higher education
(medium education); and (3) at least one of the parents attended higher education (high education).
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For instance, Figure 2.3 shows how the model fits parents’ choice in terms of school
type, namely, their decision about attending public, voucher-private or non voucher-
private schools. Furthermore, the model is also able to generate the average quality
of the schools selected by parents (Figure 2.4), which in the model is determined
by how much parents care about quality, the correlation between quality and other
features that parents value, and the admissions restrictions that parents face when
they make their decision.
Figure 2.3: Student fraction by school type
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Figure 2.4: Average quality of the school selected by grade
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One common feature of many educational systems, which is extremely problematic
in the Chilean case,106 is the fact that students’ access to different schools in terms
of quality depends on their income. In the context of the model, this means that
the initial knowledge gap K0i − K0i′, is increased by KT i − KT i′ − (K0i − K0i′) =
(KT i −K0i)− (KT i′ −K0i′).
The model has several channels that can generate this correlation: parents can have
differences in preferences about quality, differences in cognitive skills to understand
information about schools, differences in involvement in the child’s school, and dif-
ferences in their choice restrictions. Figure 2.5 shows how, in the data and in the
model, the knowledge gain is positively correlated with parents’ education. This
figure also says that the model overpredicts the gain for students with parents of low
or medium education, and underpredicts this gain for students with highly educated
parents.
106Valenzuela, Bellei, and Rı´os (2014).
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Figure 2.5: Gain in Knowledge by parents education (KT −K0)
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Overall, the fit of the model when the sample considers all the students in Santiago
City is similar to the model fit when the estimation sample is used (Appendix B.3).
The most important difference is that the former underestimates the frequency of
school switches.
Parents Perception about Quality
Given the estimated parameters, it is possible to calculate the differences between
parents’ perception about school quality (which is determined by ηˆi) and the effective
quality of each school (q˜jt = ̂E[qjt|STjt]). Moreover, it is interesting to see how the
distance between perception and reality affects the three school types differently.
To this end, I take two prototypical parents, one with low education and with a
choice set of 50 schools, the other highly educated with the same size choice set,
and then calculate which would be their quality perception for each school of the
sample. To conclude, I calculate the distance between perception and reality for
each school.107 Figure 2.6 shows the results of this exercise. In the first place, there
is an important distance between perception and reality. In the second place, this
107In practice, what I calculate is Et−1[qjt|Dit−1 6= j]− q˜jt.
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misperception is less severe for more educated parents. Finally, this misperception
biases parents’ preferences toward private schools. This bias is driven by the fact that
voucher-private schools have more educated parents than public schools, whereas the
same is true between non voucher-private and voucher-private schools. As discussed
in the model section, because ηiχ ≥ 0, parents overestimate the quality for schools
whose students have, on average, highly educated parents.
Figure 2.6: Quality misperception by school administration type (2004)
(a) Parents with Low Education (S(Λ) = 50)
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(b) Parents with High Education (S(Λ = 50))
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Counterfactual Experiments
To assess how important school quality is in parents’ decisions, I simulate the model,
randomly picking half of the schools and increasing their quality by 0.5 std, while
decreasing the quality of the rest by the same amount. Then, I calculate the increase
in the fraction of parents sending their children to the former schools. To see how
relevant quality is in the first decision (first grade), vis-a-vis later decisions, I do this
exercise by increasing schools’ quality in different periods. For instance, I do not
affect school quality until t, and I perform these quality changes from t+ 1 to T .
Figure 2.7 shows the results of these exercises. On one hand, there is a moderate
increase, of 4-5 percentage points, in the demand for schools that increase their
quality since the first period. On the other hand, the effect is irrelevant when schools
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change their quality after the first decision is made (1st grade).
Figure 2.7: Increase in the fraction of students in schools with higher quality
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To study the mechanisms in parents’ demand that explain the frequency of switching
schools, the allocation of students across school types, and the correlation between
the gain in knowledge and parents’ educational level, I simulate the model under the
following scenarios:108
• No misperception (η = 0): parents correctly estimate school quality from
standardized tests.
• Only quality matters: U = β ∗K + C ∗ (Dit 6= Dit−1) + ǫ.
• All admitted: P (ADitj = 1|Xi) = 1 ∀i, j, t.
• Random admissions: ADij ⊥⊥ Xi.
• C ∗ 0.9: cost of changing school reduced by 10%.
108It should be noticed that many of these policies may affect the choice set definition. Thus, given
that a choice set is fixed in all these simulations, the effects of these policies are underestimated in
this analysis.
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• New locations: Parents with the lowest education are relocated to the munic-
ipality with highest average quality. Parents with the highest education are
relocated to the municipality with lowest average quality.
• All ED = 3: All the students have the same knowledge endowment (K0).
Table 2.1 shows the fractions of parents who switch schools by grade in the baseline
simulation (first column), and the differences in percentage points – compared to
the baseline – under each of the counterfactual experiments. From this table, it
follows that, if parents were just concerned about quality, they would switch more
often, which is explained by the fact that the other schools’ characteristics are more
stable across the years (SES, price in std, and type). Admissions restrictions play a
relevant role in attenuating the frequency of switches. Finally, and more obviously,
this frequency is also attenuated by the switch cost.
Table 2.1: Fraction of students changing school by grade (with respect to baseline
in percentage points)
Baseline No misperception Only Q All admitted Random C ∗ 0.9 New All ED = 3
maters admission locations
2nd 6.9% -0.3 0.6 12.2 0.0 4.9 -1.8 -0.3
3th 6.2% -0.1 1.4 12.4 0.3 4.7 -1.4 0.0
4th 5.7% -0.1 1.8 12.2 0.3 4.5 -1.4 -0.1
5th 5.2% 0.1 2.3 12.0 0.4 4.5 -1.1 0.0
6th 4.8% -0.1 2.4 11.4 0.3 4.1 -1.0 -0.0
7th 6.1% -0.3 1.6 10.4 -0.1 4.9 -1.8 -0.2
8th 4.5% 0.0 3.0 10.2 -0.2 3.5 -1.1 -0.2
Table 2.2 shows the fraction of parents by school type in the baseline simulation
(first column), and the differences in percentage points – compared to the baseline
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– under each of the counterfactual experiments. Even though parents’ perception
is importantly biased in favor of private schools (with and without vouchers), when
they decide based on the real quality, the fraction of parents attending public schools
increases by a moderate 1.2 percentage points. This small effect, relative to the size
of the misperception, is explained by the fact that parents do not care too much
about quality. In fact, if parents were only concerned with school quality, there
would be an increase of 1.9 percentage points in the fraction of parents choosing
public schools, while this figure would decrease by 2.7 percentage points for voucher-
private schools. This basically reflects the fact that the other elements of the utility
function (SES of the school, the preference for its type, etc.) lead parents to apply
to private schools.109 Finally, these simulations allow us to see what would happen if
less educated parents had a more relaxed choice set constraint. Columns 3, 4, and 7,
all tell the same story: less choice set restrictions would lead (less educated) parents
to choose private schools more often, though not necessary because of their higher
quality.
Table 2.2: Student fraction by school type at first grade (with respect to baseline in
percentage points)
Baseline No misperception Only Q All admitted Random C ∗ 0.9 New All ED = 3
maters admission locations
Public 29.2% 1.2 1.9 -3.8 -3.2 0.6 -0.5 -4.1
Voucher Private 65.1% -0.6 -2.7 0.4 0.6 -0.1 3.7 2.4
Non voucher 5.7% -0.7 0.8 3.4 2.7 -0.5 -3.2 1.6
Private
Table 2.3 shows the knowledge that students gained between 2004 and 2011, by
parents’ education. While the numbers of the baseline simulation are presented in
the first column, the numbers in the other columns are the differences in standard
109It should be noticed that, in this model, peer effects are part of the school quality, which is
constant in all the policy experiments. Therefore, in this model it is not possible to study a potential
self-fulfilling prophecy, in which parents think that private schools are better, and therefore apply
to those schools; those schools select the best students (those who have more educated parents);
and, because of that pattern of admissions decisions, and given the peer effect, private schools end
up being better than the public ones.
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deviations – compared to the baseline – under each of the counterfactual experiments.
The first result to notice is that, while an exclusive focus on quality would increase
the knowledge gained by students whose parents have medium or high education,
this shift in preferences would not have a relevant effect for students whose parents
have a low level of education. This confirms the relevance of choice restrictions: for
some parents, even if they put more weight on quality, they cannot find a better
school for their child. A second element to notice is that both prohibiting schools
from making admission decisions based on student characteristics and reallocating
the poor families to better municipalities are effective measures to reduce the gap
between students with parents with different levels of education.110
Table 2.3: Gain of knowledge (KT − K0) by parents education (with respect to
baseline in standard deviations).
Baseline No misperception Only Q All admitted Random C ∗ 0.9 New All ED = 3
maters admission locations
Incompleted High -0.240 -0.025 0.009 0.174 0.119 0.002 0.143 0.135
school
Completed High 0.096 -0.045 0.112 0.258 0.201 0.002 0.021 0.202
school
With college 0.807 -0.095 0.204 0.153 0.057 -0.031 -0.008 0.024
studies
Appendix B.3 contains the tables that show the results of the counterfactual exper-
iments when using the complete sample, which includes all the students of Santiago
City who entered first grade in 2003. Although the complete sample incorporates
all the small municipalities that were not part of the estimation sample, the main
conclusions (elaborated from Tables 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3) are not affected.
110This can be concluded by looking at columns 5, 8, and 7 of Table 2.3. Notice that in all
these counterfactual experiments, the choice set (Λ) is fixed, in the sense that the set is invariant
conditional on the municipality where parents live and their educational level. Thus, when a family
of parents with low education is relocated from municipality A to municipality B, their new choice
set (Λ) is going be the choice set of a family with low-educated parents who live in municipality B.
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2.7 Conclusions
This paper estimates a dynamic model of elementary school choice. To this end, I
use detailed Chilean administrative data for the students who entered 1st grade of
the elementary cycle in 2003, following them until 8th grade (2011), which in Chile
is the end of the elementary cycle. The estimated model considers several elements
that are relevant to explain parents’ decisions, namely, how much do they care about
school quality (and other school characteristics), parents’ skill in understanding in-
formation about quality (national standardized tests), parents’ involvement in the
school attended by their children, and their choice set.
Assessing the relevance of these different components contributes to a better un-
derstanding of the demand for schools and the role that markets with competitive
incentives can have in education. In particular, the structural approach followed in
this paper allows me to quantify different sources of unequal access to high quality
schools and of the higher demand for private schools than for public schools. In do-
ing so, this paper also contributes to the scarce literature that estimates structural
models with bounded rationality, as well as to the literature which uses observed
choices to infer agents’ information.
Regarding the debate about the extent to which parents base their decisions on school
quality, I find that parents do care about school quality, but only to a moderate
degree. Moreover, the simulations show that parents’ decisions are not sensitive to
changes in quality after the first decision (1st grade). I also find that more involved
parents care marginally more about school quality.
The results show that parents have an important misperception about school quality,
which causes them to have a less favorable opinion about public schools, relative to
private schools. This result supports the idea that parents may have difficulty in
isolating a school’s quality from its socioeconomic composition when they observe
test scores. However, given that quality is not very relevant for their decision, such
a misperception has only a limited effect on parents’ decisions.
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Concerning the question of why parents choose private schools over public schools,
the results show that, if parents were only concerned about quality, they would
choose public schools more often. The result would be the same if they did not
have a misperception about quality. However, if parents had more freedom in terms
of the schools their children could attend, they would choose private schools more
often. This last result suggests that admission rules are binding restrictions and that
relaxing them would increase the demand for private schools.
Regarding the causes of the increase in the knowledge gap between students from
different socioeconomic backgrounds, simulations show that schools’ admission rules
and household location are relevant in explaining the rise in this gap. This result
supports the papers which argue that Chilean SES school segregation cannot be
explained only by geographical segregation.111
Finally, it should be noticed that, even though these counterfactual exercises are
very useful to compare the effects of different policies on relevant outcomes (e.g.,
inequality), these are in general small effects. The latter can be partially explained
by the fact that, in all the simulations, the choice set is fixed conditional on parents’
education and home location. This limitation is something that should be addressed
in future research.
111See, for example, Valenzuela, Bellei, and Rı´os (2014), Elacqua (2012) and Hsieh and Urquiola
(2006).
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Appendix A
The Impact of College Admissions
Policies on The Performance of
High School Students
A.1 Existence and Uniqueness
Existence
Lemma 2: If ∀ i : θ1(RN − R1)a
2
1iφ(1) < σ
2
η and
∑
imiΦ
(
θ1(RN−R1)−F¯C
σfc
)
>
∑N
δ=2 Sδ
there exists at least one equilibrium.
Proof: To prove the lemma, I show that the conditions for the Brouwer fixed point theorem
are satisfied. Let Gn(r) = rn −
∑N
δ=n Sδ +
∑
imiΦ
(
Di(r)− ¯FC
σfc
) [
1− Φ
(
rn−e1i (r)a1i−a0i
ση
)]
,
where r ∈ RN−1, then I define the vector-value function G(r) as:112
112e1i (r) stands for the optimal effort decision for those who decide to take the college admissions
test given the vector of cutoff scores r.
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G(r) =

G2(r)
G3(r)
.
.
.
GN (r)

G(r) =

r2 −
(∑N
δ=2 Sδ −
∑
imiΦ
(
Di(r)− ¯FC
σfc
) [
1− Φ
(
r2−e1i (r)a1i−a0i
ση
)])
r3 −
(∑N
δ=3 Sδ −
∑
imiΦ
(
Di(r)− ¯FC
σfc
) [
1− Φ
(
r3−e1i (r)a1i−a0i
ση
)])
.
.
.
rN −
(∑N
δ=n+1 Sδ −
∑
imiΦ
(
Di(r)− ¯FC
σfc
) [
1− Φ
(
rN−e
1
i (r)a1i−a0i
ση
)])

Hence, proving existence for the general equilibrium is equivalent to showing the existence
of a fixed point for G(r). In order to fulfil the Brouwer fixed point theorem’s conditions,
the vector-valued function G : M →M should be continuous and M non-empty, compact
and convex subset of some Euclidean space RN−1.
Given that the effort decision of any student is bounded by [mini{ei},maxi{e¯i}] it is clear
that:113
r→∞⇒
∑
i
miΦ
(
Di(r)− F¯C
σfc
)[
1− Φ
(
rn − e
1
i (r)a1i − a0i
ση
)]
→ 0,
113As r → −∞
Di = θ1
(
N−1∑
n=1
(Rn −Rn+1) Φ
(
rn − a1ieˆ
1
i − a0i
ση
))
+ θ1(RN −R1)
+ θ2b1i(eˆ
1
i − eˆ
0
i )−
(eˆ1i )
2 − (eˆ0i )
2
2
→ θ1(RN −R1),
because as r → −∞, |eˆ1i − eˆ
0
i | → 0, ∀i.
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r → −∞⇒
∑
i
miΦ
(
Di(r)− F¯C
σfc
)[
1− Φ
(
rn − e
1
i (r)a1i − a0i
ση
)]
→
∑
i
miΦ
(
θ1(RN −R1)− F¯C
σfc
)
>
N∑
δ=2
Sδ.
Then, taking any small number ε > 0, it is true that:
∀ n : r →∞⇒ Gn(r + ε ∗~1)−Gn(r)→ ε > 0
∀ n : r → −∞⇒ Gn(r − ε ∗~1)−Gn(r)→ −ε < 0
Therefore, there exist two vectors r and r¯ such that ∀ r < r¯ ⇒ G(r) < G(r¯) < r¯ and
∀ r > r ⇒ G(r) > G(r) > r.114 Hence, I can define the set M = {r ∈ RN−1, r ≤ r ≤ r¯}.
This set is not empty, compact and convex.115
To show that G(r) is continuous it is sufficient to prove that ∀i ei(r) is continuous.
116
Moreover, applying the Berge’s maximum theorem and considering the fact that the ef-
fort decision of any student is bounded by [mini{ei},maxi{e¯i}] (compact set), a sufficient
condition for the continuity of e1i (r) is that the objective function for those students who
decide to take the college admissions test is strictly concave.
Taking the derivative to the first order condition (1.11), it follows that:
∂2U1i (e)
∂e2
= θ1
N−1∑
n=1
(Rn+1 −Rn)
(
rn+1 − a1ie− a0i
ση
)
φ
(
rn+1 − a1ie− a0i
ση
)(
a1i
ση
)2
− 1
But because the first term can not be bigger than θ1(RN −R1)
(
a1i
ση
)2
φ(1), then117
θ1(RN −R1)a
2
1iφ(1) < σ
2
η ⇒
∂2U1i (e)
∂e2
< 0
114Because there exist r¯ such that ∀r > r¯:
∑
imiΦ
(
Di(r)−F¯C
σfc
) [
1− Φ
(
rn−e
1
i (r)a1i−a0i
ση
)]
<∑N
δ=n Sδ, and r such that ∀r < r:
∑
imiΦ
(
Di(r)−F¯C
σfc
) [
1− Φ
(
rn−e
1
i (r)a1i−a0i
ση
)]
>
∑N
δ=n Sδ.
115To be sure about non-emptiness, it is possible to pick r < 0 and r¯ > 0.
116If e1i (r) is continuous then Di(r) is also continuous.
117The function xφ(x) is maximized at x = 1.
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Moreover, G(r) is well defined for any r because, as it was shown above, for any r there
exist optimal efforts for those who take the college admissions test (e1i (r)) and for those
who do not take the test (e0i (r)). 
Uniqueness
Lemma 3: In the case where N = 2, the equilibrium is unique when it exists.
Proof: The lemma is proved by contradiction. In particular, assuming there are two
equilibria {r, e} and {r′, e′}, where without loss of generality r′ > r,118 from the general
equilibrium definition it is directly shown that:
S =
∑
i
miΦ
(
Di − F¯C
σfc
)[
1− Φ
(
r − eia1i − a0i
ση
)]
S =
∑
i
miΦ
(
D
′
i − F¯C
σfc
)[
1− Φ
(
r′ − e
′
ia1i − a0i
ση
)]
(A.1)
To get the contradiction I proceed in two steps. First, I show that the statement: ∀r′ >
r, i : Φ
(
r′−e′ia1i−a0i
σε
)
− Φ
(
r−eia1i−a0i
σε
)
> 0, is a sufficient condition to get the desired
contradiction. Second, I show that this statement is true regardless of the continuity of
effort in r.
Step 1:
In fact, let Π0 = maxe U
0
i (e) and Π1(r) = maxe U
1
i (e), then Di = Π1(r) + FCi − Π0.
119
Taking the derivative to Di with respect to r,
120
∂Di
∂r
=
∂Π1(r)
∂r
= (R1 −R2)
θ1
a1
φ
(
r − ea1 − a0
ση
)
< 0
⇒
(
Di − F¯C
σfc
)
>
(
D
′
i − F¯C
σfc
)
Therefore, from the later inequality and equations (A.1) it is directly shown that:
118Notice because N = 2, r and r′ are scalars. S is the amount of seats offered by the only
university.
119The value function for those who do not take the college admissions test does not depend on r.
120Here, I am assuming that effort is continuous in r (if that is the case, the value function is
differentiable), but in the step 2 I also show that Π1(r) > Π1(r
′) when effort is not continuous in r.
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∑
i
mi
(
Φ
(
Di − F¯C
σfc
)[
1− Φ
(
r − eia1i − a0i
ση
)]
− Φ
(
D
′
i − F¯C
σfc
)
[
1− Φ
(
r′ − e
′
ia1i − a0i
ση
)])
= 0
⇒
∑
i
mi
([
1− Φ
(
r − eia1i − a0i
ση
)]
−
[
1− Φ
(
r′ − e
′
ia1i − a0i
ση
)])
< 0
⇒
∑
i
mi
(
Φ
(
r′ − e
′
ia1i − a0i
ση
)
−Φ
(
r − eia1i − a0i
ση
))
< 0
where this last inequality contradicts that ∀r′ > r, i : Φ
(
r′−e′ia1i−a0i
σε
)
−Φ
(
r−eia1i−a0i
σε
)
> 0

Step 2:
I prove this inequality in two steps. First, I prove it for those r where the effort decision
is continuous. Then, I show the inequality when the effort decision is not continuous in r.
Case 1: effort decision is continuous in r:
Taking a derivative of the first order condition (1.11), when N = 2 implies:121
θ1(R2 −R1)
∂φ(r)
∂r
[
1− ∂e∂ra1
ση
]
a1
ση
=
∂e
∂r
⇒
∂e
∂r
=
θ1(R2 −R1)
∂φ(r)
∂r
a1
σ2η
1 + θ1(R2 −R1)
∂φ(r)
∂r
(
a1
ση
)2
⇒ 1−
∂e
∂r
a1 =
1
1 + θ1(R2 −R1)
∂φ(r)
∂r
(
a1
ση
)2 (A.2)
Therefore,
∂Φ
(
r−ea1−a0
ση
)
∂r
= φ
(
r − ea1 − a0
ση
)(
1−
∂e
∂r
a1
)
1
ση
=
φ
(
r−ea1−a0
ση
)
1
ση
1 + θ1(R2 −R1)
∂φ(r)
∂r
(
a1
ση
)2
121For simplicity, I suppress the individual sub-index and denote φ
(
r−ea1−a0
ση
)
as φ(r).
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Thus, to get the desired result, it is enough showing that 1 + θ1(R2 −R1)
∂φ(r)
∂r
(
a1
ση
)2
> 0.
In fact, this inequality is ensured by the second order condition:122
−θ1(R2 −R1)
∂φ(r)
∂r
(
a1
ση
)2
− 1 < 0
Therefore, it follows that
∂Φ
(
r−ea1−a0
ση
)
∂r > 0. 
Case 2: effort decision is discontinuous in r:123
Without loss of generality, assume there are two different effort decisions which are optimal
at r (eh > el). Defining Πx = θ1(R1−R2)Φ
(
r−exa1−a0
ση
)
+θ1R2+θ2(b0+b1ex)−
e2x
2 , x = l, h
(the value function for each local equilibrium) and applying the envelope theorem imply:
∂Πl
∂r
−
∂Πh
∂r
=
θ1(R2 −R1)
ση
[
φ
(
r − ela1 − a0
ση
)
− φ
(
r − eha1 − a0
ση
)]
(A.3)
Moreover, from the first order conditions it is directly shown that:
eh − el =
a1θ1(R2 −R1)
ση
[
φ
(
r − ela1 − a0
ση
)
− φ
(
r − eha1 − a0
ση
)]
⇒
∂Πl
∂r
−
∂Πh
∂r
=
eh − el
ση
> 0 (A.4)
Therefore, by (A.4) I proved that increasing r leads to some jump in the global opti-
mal effort from high local optimal effort to low local optimal effort, which ensured that
∀r′ > r such that the effort decision is not continuous at r for students type i, then
Φ
(
r′−e′ia1i−a0i
ση
)
− Φ
(
r−eia1i−a0i
ση
)
> 0. 
In the case where N > 2, as in this paper, it can be established that
∑N−1
n=1
∂Gm
∂rn
< 0 ∀m,
where Gm = Gm− rm. This result implies that if G(r) = 0 (i.e., r is an equilibrium), then
r′ = r(a + 1) where a 6= 0, can not be an equilibrium.124 Loosely speaking, this means
122I am assuming away −θ1(R2 −R1)
∂φ(r)
∂r
(
a1
ση
)2
− 1 = 0.
123Given that the discontinuity is possible only for those who take the college ad-
missions test, for this proof I assume away the possibility of not taking the college
admissions test.
124It would be better to show that this is true even when the increase (or decrease) is not propor-
tional across score cutoffs. Such a result is not established in this paper. Moreover, I am not sure
about the veracity of the statement.
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that if there is an equilibrium denoted by r, the farther r′ departs from r the harder it is
to have r′ as another equilibrium.
To prove the statement, I proceed in two steps.125 First, it is proved that
∑N
n=2
∂Gm
∂rn
<
−
∑
imiΦ
(
Di−FC
σfc
)
φi(rm)
ση
[
1− a1i
∑N
n=2
∂e1i
∂rn
]
.126 Second, I show that 1− a1i
∑N
n=2
∂e1i
∂rn
>
0 ∀i.
To get the first result, notice that:
∀n 6= m :
∂Gm
∂rn
=
∑
i
miΦ
(
Di − FC
σfc
)
[1− φi(rm)]
∂Di
∂rn
1
σfc
+
∑
i
miΦ
(
Di − FC
σfc
)
φi(rm)
∂e1i
∂rn
a1i
σfc
<
∑
i
miΦ
(
Di − FC
σfc
)
φi(rm)
∂e1i
∂rn
a1i
σfc
∂Gm
∂rm
=
∑
i
miΦ
(
Di − FC
σfc
)
[1− φi(rm)]
∂Di
∂rm
1
σfc
−
∑
i
miΦ
(
Di − FC
σfc
)
φi(rm)
σfc[
1−
∂e1i
∂rm
a1i
]
< −
∑
i
miΦ
(
Di − FC
σfc
)
φi(rm)
σfc
[
1−
∂e1i
∂rm
a1i
]
where both inequalities are driven by the fact that ∂Di∂rm < 0. From these two inequalities
it follows the first result:
N∑
n=2
∂Gm
∂rn
< −
∑
i
miΦ
(
Di − FC
σfc
)
φi(rm)
σfc
+
N∑
n=2
∑
i
miΦ
(
Di − FC
σfc
)
φi(rm)
∂e1i
∂rn
a1i
σfc
= −
∑
i
miΦ
(
Di − FC
σfc
)
φi(rm)
σfc
[
1− a1i
N∑
n=2
∂e1i
∂rn
]
To establish the second result, I begin taking the derivative to the first order condition for
those who decide taking the college admissions test. When that is done, I get:
125For simplicity the result is shown for the case where G is continuous.
126φi(rm) = φ
(
rm−e
1
i a1i−a0i
ση
)
.
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∂e1i
∂rm
= θ1
N∑
n=2
(Rn+1 −Rn)
(
rn − e
1
i a1i − a0i
ση
)
φi(rn)
(
a1i
ση
)2
∂e1i
∂rm
−
θ1(Rm+1 −Rm)
(
rm − e
1
i a1i − a0i
ση
)
φi(rm)
a1i
σ2η
=
−θ1(Rm+1 −Rm)
(
rm−e1i a1i−a0i
ση
)
φi(rm)
a1i
σ2η
1− θ1
∑N
n=2(Rn+1 −Rn)
(
rn−e1i a1i−a0i
ση
)
φi(rn)
(
a1i
ση
)2
⇒ 1− a1i
N∑
n=2
∂e1i
∂rn
=
1
1− θ1
∑N
n=2(Rn+1 −Rn)
(
rn−e1i a1i−a0i
ση
)
φi(rn)
(
a1i
ση
)2 > 0
where the inequality is because the denominator is positive, due to the second order con-
dition of student maximization. 
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A.2 Variable Descriptions
Table A.1: Variable Descriptions
Variable Description
Independent Variables
SEX Takes 1 if the students is male and 0 if is female.
EDU MO1 Takes 1 if there is no information about mother’s education (0 otherwise).
EDU MO2 Takes 1 if student’s mother has some courses at the primary education level or she does not have formal education (0 otherwise).
EDU MO3 Takes 1 if student’s mother finished primary education or she has some courses of secondary education (0 otherwise).
EDU MO4 Takes 1 if student’s mother finished secondary education (0 otherwise).
EDU MO5 Takes 1 if student’s mother had or finished technical post secondary education (0 otherwise).
EDU MO6 Takes 1 if student’s mother had some years or finished college education (0 otherwise).
EDU FAC Takes 1 if student’s father had some years or finished college education (0 otherwise).
DEP P1 Takes 1 if student’s primary school is public (0 otherwise).
DEP P2 Takes 1 if student’s primary school is private and subsidized by the government (0 otherwise).
DEP P3 Takes 1 if student’s primary school is private and not subsidized by the government (0 otherwise).
DEP S1 Takes 1 if student’s high school is public (0 otherwise).
DEP S2 Takes 1 if student’s high school is private and subsidized by the government (0 otherwise).
DEP S3 Takes 1 if student’s high school is private and not subsidized by the government (0 otherwise).
SES P1 Takes 1 if student’s primary school belongs to the first socio-economic group type (0 otherwise).
SES P2 Takes 1 if student’s primary school belongs to the second socio-economic group type (0 otherwise).
SES P3 Takes 1 if student’s primary school belongs to the third socio-economic group type (0 otherwise).
SES P4 Takes 1 if student’s primary school belongs to the forth socio-economic group type (0 otherwise).
SES P5 Takes 1 if student’s primary school belongs to the fifth socio-economic group type (0 otherwise).
SES P1 Takes 1 if student’s high school belongs to the first socio-economic group type (0 otherwise).
SES P2 Takes 1 if student’s high school belongs to the second socio-economic group type (0 otherwise).
SES P3 Takes 1 if student’s high school belongs to the third socio-economic group type (0 otherwise).
SES P4 Takes 1 if student’s high school belongs to the forth socio-economic group type (0 otherwise).
SES P5 Takes 1 if student’s high school belongs to the fifth socio-economic group type (0 otherwise).
RURAL P Takes 1 if student’s primary school is located in a rural area (0 otherwise).
RURAL S Takes 1 if student’s high school is located in a rural area (0 otherwise).
LENG CONT Is the proportion (reported by the students) of the 8th year verbal test’s contents that was covered in classes.
MATH CONT Is the proportion (reported by the students) of the 8th year math test’s contents that was covered in classes.
NAT CONT Is the proportion (reported by the students) of the 8th year natural science test’s contents that was covered in classes.
SOC CONT Is the proportion (reported by the students) of the 8th year social science test’s contents that was covered in classes.
Like math I like to study math: 1 (strongly agree), 2 (agree), 3 (disagree and strongly disagree).
Like spanish I like to study Spanish: 1 (strongly agree), 2 (agree), 3 (disagree and strongly disagree).
Primary Education Students’ Performance
SIMCE V P Verbal SIMCE at 8th primary grade.
SIMCE M P Math SIMCE at 8th primary grade.
SIMCE S P Social Science SIMCE at 8th primary grade.
SIMCE N P Natural Science SIMCE at 8th primary grade.
GPA P Grade point average at 8th primary grade.
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Variable Description
Secondary Education Students’ Performance
SIMCE V S Verbal SIMCE at 2nd secondary grade.
SIMCE M S Math SIMCE at 2nd secondary grade.
PSU M Math national test for college admissions.
PSU V Verbal national test for college admissions.
GPA S Grade point average at 2nd secondary grade.
TAKE PSU Takes 1 if the student takes the PSU test (0 otherwise).
Measures of Effort in Primary Education
ME1 When I study, I exert effort even if it is a difficult subject: 1 (always or almost always), 2 (often), 3 (occasionally)
and 4 (never or almost never).
ME2 When I study, I try hard to learn: 1 (always or almost always), 2 (often), 3 (occasionally) and 4 (never or almost never).
ME3 When I study and I am not getting something, I look for additional information: 1 (always or almost always), 2 (often), 3 (occasionally)
and 4 (never or almost never).
ATTEN P Percentage of attendance in 8th primary grade.
STUDY LENG How often the student studies Spanish: 1 (every or almost every day), 2 (some days a week), 3 (Just for exams),
and 4 (Never besides the study at class time).
STUDY MATH How often the student studies Math: 1 (every or almost every day), 2 (some days a week), 3 (Just for exams),
and 4 (Never besides the study at class time).
STUDY NAT How often the student studies Natural Science: 1 (every or almost every day), 2 (some days a week), 3 (Just for exams),
and 4 (Never besides the study at class time).
STUDY SOC How often the student studies Social Science: 1 (every or almost every day), 2 (some days a week), 3 (Just for exams),
and 4 (Never besides the study at class time).
Measures of Effort in Secondary Education
ATTEN S Percentage of attendance in 2nd secondary grade.
EFFORT P The student exerts effort and she (or he) is persistent.
use space How often does the student do homework in the space conditioned to study at home: 1 (never), 2 (rarely), 3 (frequently) and
4 (almost always).
use sb How often does the student read textbooks at home: 1 (never), 2 (rarely), 3 (frequently) and 4 (almost always).
use calc How often does the student use calculator to study at home: 1 (never), 2 (rarely), 3 (frequently) and 4 (almost always).
Measures of Learning Skills
MS1 I feel able to understand the harder subjects covered by the teachers: 1 (always or almost always), 2 (often), 3 (occasionally) and
4 (never or almost never).
MS2 I trust that I can do excellent homework and exams: 1 (always or almost always), 2 (often), 3 (occasionally) and 4 (never or almost
never).
MS2 If I set a goal about learning well something, I can do it: 1 (always or almost always), 2 (often), 3 (occasionally) and 4 (never
or almost never).
MS4 If I decide not to have poor marks, I really can avoid them: 1 (always or almost always), 2 (often), 3 (occasionally) and
4 (never or almost never).
MS5 When I study I lose the focus, because I am not good at studying: 1 (always or almost always), 2 (often), 3 (occasionally) and 4 (never
or almost never).
REP BI Takes 1 if the student has repeated at least one grade, 0 otherwise.
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Table A.2: Independent Variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N
SEX 0.47 0.50 0 1 146319
EDU MO1 0.16 0.37 0 1 146319
EDU MO2 0.12 0.32 0 1 146319
EDU MO3 0.24 0.42 0 1 146319
EDU MO4 0.26 0.44 0 1 146319
EDU MO5 0.11 0.32 0 1 146319
EDU MO6 0.10 0.30 0 1 146319
EDU FAC 0.14 0.35 0 1 146319
DEP P1 0.49 0.50 0 1 146319
DEP P2 0.41 0.49 0 1 146319
DEP P3 0.10 0.29 0 1 146319
DEP S1 0.39 0.49 0 1 146319
DEP S2 0.52 0.50 0 1 146319
DEP S3 0.09 0.29 0 1 146319
SES P1 0.08 0.27 0 1 146319
SES P2 0.29 0.45 0 1 146319
SES P3 0.36 0.48 0 1 146319
SES P4 0.18 0.39 0 1 146319
SES P5 0.09 0.29 0 1 146319
SES S1 0.16 0.37 0 1 146319
SES S2 0.37 0.48 0 1 146319
SES S3 0.26 0.44 0 1 146319
SES S4 0.12 0.33 0 1 146319
SES S5 0.09 0.28 0 1 146319
RURAL P 0.11 0.31 0 1 146319
RURAL S 0.04 0.19 0 1 146319
LENG CONT 0.91 0.06 0.31 1 146304
MATH CONT 0.95 0.05 0.12 1 146318
NAT CONT 0.84 0.09 0.30 1 146318
SOC CONT 0.90 0.09 0.07 1 146318
Table A.3: Primary Education Students’ Performance
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N
SIMCE M P 268.64 48.50 116 406 145236
SIMCE V P 267.56 48.34 96 392 145944
SIMCE N P 271.28 48.84 120 411 146177
SIMCE S P 265.98 47.60 113 387 145011
GPA P 5.87 0.52 4 7 146319
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Table A.4: Secondary Education Students’ Performance
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N
SIMCE M S 268.59 62.68 93 427 146041
SIMCE V S 266.25 50.49 120 398 146083
PSU M 508.20 110.70 150 850 113946
PSU V 505.05 108.85 177 850 113946
TAKE PSU 0.78 0.42 0 1 113946
GPA S 537.39 100.93 208 826 146319
Table A.5: Measures of Effort in Primary Education
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N
ME1 1.72 0.81 1 4 146319
ME2 2.08 1.00 1 4 146319
ME3 1.52 0.72 1 4 146319
ATTEN P 95.71 3.87 60 100 146319
STUDY LENG 2.60 0.72 1 4 146319
STUDY MATH 2.53 0.80 1 4 146319
Table A.6: Measures of Effort in Secondary Education
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N
ATTEN S 93.78 3.86 71.5 100 146319
EFFORT P 0.27 0.44 0 1 137532
use calc 3.71 0.83 2 5 111366
use sb 4.02 0.79 2 5 114742
use space 4.18 0.82 2 5 92329
Table A.7: Measures of Learning Skills
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N
MS1 1.89 0.81 1 4 145938
MS2 1.59 0.74 1 4 145768
MS3 1.33 0.59 1 4 145581
MS4 1.56 0.80 1 4 145261
REP 0.07 0.25 0 1 144128
The definition of SES (socio-economics groups) was made by the Ministry of Education
using cluster analysis and four variables: a) father’s years of education, b) mother’s years
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of education, c) monthly family income (declared), and d) an index of vulnerability of the
school.
To characterize student families I only use information of SIMCE 2006. This is because if
I had also used 2004 information I would have lost more data, since some parents do not
answer the questionnaire.
A.3 Identification
Step 1, final score’s expectation and variance:
Let Ti ∈ {PMi, PVi, GPA
h
i }, it is direct that
Ti = β
T
0 + x
h
i β
T
1 + β
T
2 (Me
h
1i − x
e1h
i β
e1h
1 ) + β
T
3 (Mλ
p
1i − x
λ1p
i β
λ1p
1 )− (β
T
2 ε
e1h
i + β
T
3 ε
λ1p
i ) + ε
T
i
Thus, defining δTi = ε
T
i − (β
T
2 ε
e1h
i + β
T
3 ε
λ1p
i ), it is possible to construct the following
moment conditions:127 E[δTi |x
h
i ] = 0, E[δ
T
i |x
e1h
i ] = 0, E[δ
T
i |x
λ1p
i ] = 0, E[δ
T
i |Me
h
2i] = 0 and
E[δTi |Mλ
p
2i] = 0 from which β
T , βe1h and βλ1p are identified.128 Therefore, {βpm, βpv, βgh}
are identified.
Given that {βpm, βpv, βgh} are identified, it is trivial that {var(δpmi ), var(δ
pv
i ), var(δ
gh
i )} are
also identified. Hence, to show the identification of {var(εpmi ), var(ε
pv
i ), var(ε
gh
i )} notice
that:
cov(Ti − β
T
0 − x
h
i β
T
1 − β
T
2 (Me
h
1i − x
e1h
i β
e1h
1 )− β
T
3 (Mλ
p
1i − x
λ1p
i β
λ1p
1 ),Me
h
1i − x
e1h
i β
e1h
1 ) =
cov(εTi − (β
T
2 ε
e1h
i + β
T
3 ε
λ1p
i ), e
h
i + ε
e1h
i ) = −β
T
2 var(ε
e1h
i )
cov(Ti − β
T
0 − x
h
i β
T
1 − β
T
2 (Me
h
1i − x
e1h
i β
e1h
1 )− β
T
3 (Mλ
p
1i − x
λ1p
i β
λ1p
1 ),Mλ
p
1i − x
λ1p
i β
λ1p
1 ) =
cov(εTi − (β
T
2 ε
e1h
i + β
T
3 ε
λ1p
i ), λ
p
i + ε
λ1p
i ) = −β
T
3 var(ε
λ1p
i )
127Because the effort decision is taken before the shocks’ realization, such a decision is independent
of the measurement errors, when Ti ∈ {PMi, PVi}: E[δ
T
i |Me
h
2i,Mλ
p
2i, x
h
i , x
e1h
i , x
λ1p
i , TCATi =
1] = E[δTi |Me
h
2i,Mλ
p
2i, x
h
i , x
e1h
i , x
λ1p
i ]. Thus the selection is not an issue for identification.
128This implies that all the parameters involved in a0i, a1i and b1i are identified.
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Which means that var(εe1hi ) and var(ε
λ1h
i ) are identified, and consequently the vector
{var(εpmi ), var(ε
pv
i ), var(ε
gh
i )} is also identified.
Step 2, distribution of learning skills and high school student’s effort:
The nonparametric identification of f(λ) and f(eh|x) can be proved following an analysis
similar to Cunha and Heckman (2008). First, proceeding in a similar fashion as before, with
two measures for each latent variable, it is possible to identify {βsjp0 , β
sjp
1 , β
sjp
2 , β
sjp
3 , β
e1p
1 }
for any j ∈ {verbal,math, natural science, social science}. Hence, defining ̂SIMCE
p
ji =
(SIMCEpji − β
sjp
0 − x
p
i β
sjp
1 − β
sjp
2 (Me
p
1i − x
e1p
i β
e1p
1 ))
1
βsjp3
and ε̂sjpi = (ε
sjp
i − β
sjp
2 ε
e1p
i )
1
βsjp3
,
it follows that:
̂SIMCE
p
ji = λi + ε̂
sjp
i
Mλ
p
ji − x
λ1p
i β
λ1p
1 = λi + ε
λ1p
i
Therefore, because ε̂sjpi and ε
λ1p
i are independent of each other and with respect to λi, the
distribution of λ is identified (Cunha and Heckman (2008)).129
It is worth noting that, along the same lines, it is possible to prove the nonparametric
identification of f(eh|x). This would allow another way to identify the utility parameters.
Step 3, parameters of the utility function:
Once the distribution of λ is identified, it is possible to identify the utility parameters.130
First, notice that when TCATi = 0, then Me
h
1i − ε
e1h
i = bi1θ2
⇒ E[Meh1i − ε
e1h
i |TCATi = 0] = θ2E[b1i|TCATi = 0]
⇒ θ2 =
E[Meh1i|TCATi = 0]
E[b1i|TCATi = 0]
which ensures the identification of θ2.
129The identification can be achieved under much weaker conditions regarding measurement errors.
Indeed, independence is not necessary; see Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach (2010).
130Here I show the identification when the utility parameters are not individual specific, but the
extension is trivial.
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Similarly, because TCATi = 1 implies that Me
h
1i = g(xi, a1i(λi), b1i, θ1, θ2, ση) + ε
e1h
i ,
then131:
⇒ E[Meh1i|λi, xi, TCATi = 1] = E[g(xi, a1i(λi), b1i, θ1, θ2, ση)|λi, xi, TCATi = 1]
⇒
∫
λ
E[Meh1i|λ, xi, TCATi = 1]f(λ)dλ
=
∫
λ
E[g(xi, a1i(λi), b1i, θ1, θ2, ση)|λ, xi, TCATi = 1]f(λ)dλ
which allows for the identification of θ1.
Finally, the identification of F¯C and σfc is trivial since
Pr(TCATi = 1|Di(λi, xi), F¯C, σfc) = Φ
(
Di(λi, xi)− F¯C
σfc
)
⇒
∫
λ
Pr(TCATi = 1|Di(λ, xi)F¯C, σfc)f(λ)dλ =
∫
λ
Φ
(
Di(λi, xi)− F¯C
σfc
)
f(λ)dλ.
A.4 Likelihood
Let Ti = β
T
0 + x
h
i β
T
1 + e
h
i β
T
2 + λiβ
T
3 + ε
T
i , such that
Ti ∈ {PSUMi, PSUVi, GPA
h
i , SIMCE
h
math,i, SIMCE
h
verbal,i}.
Given that conditional on λi, x
h
i and e
h
i , the εi are independent across tests, the contribu-
tion of the individual i’s test to the likelihood is given by:
If Ti ∈ {PSUMi, PSUVi}:
f(Ti|x
h
i , e
h
i , λt,Ω) =
[
φ
(
Ti − β
T
0 − x
h
i β
T
1 − e
1h
i β
T
2 − λtβ
T
3
σεT
)
1
σεT
]
if TCATi = 1,
131g(xi, a1i(λi), b1i, θ1, θ2, ση) is the implicit function associated with the first order condition
(1.11).
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Pr(TCAT |xhi , e
h
i , λt,Ω) = Φ
(
Di − F¯C
σfc
)TCATi (
1− Φ
(
Di − F¯C
σfc
))1−TCATi
. (A.5)
If Ti ∈ {GPA
h
i , SIMCE
h
math,i, SIMCE
h
verbal,i}:
f(Ti|x
h
i , TCATi, e
h
i , λt,Ω) =
[
φ
(
Ti − β
T
0 − x
h
i β
T
1 − e
1h
i β
T
2 − λtβ
T
3
σεT
)
1
σεT
]TCATi
[
φ
(
Ti − β
T
0 − x
h
i β
T
1 − e
0h
i β
T
2 − λtβ
T
3
σεT
)
1
σεT
]1−TCATi
.
Fi(high school tests | Typeλ = t) =
∏
Ti
f(Ti|x
h
i , e
h
i , λt,Ω). (A.6)
Similarly, the contributions to the likelihood of high school effort measures are described
by:132
f(Mehji|x
ejh
i ,e
h
i , TCATi,Ω) =
[
φ
(
Mehji − x
ejh
i β
ejh
1 − e
1h
i α
ejh
σεejh
)
1
σεejh
]TCATi
[
φ
(
Mehji − x
ejh
i β
ejh
1 − e
0h
i α
ejp
σεejh
)
1
σεejh
]1−TCATi
, j ∈ {1, ..., Jeh},
Fi(high school effort measures) =
∏
j
f(Mehji|x
ejh
i , e
h
i , TCATi,Ω). (A.7)
Along the same lines, the contributions to the likelihood of the unobserved learning skill
measures are described by:133
f(Mλpji|x
λjp
i , λt,Ω) = φ
(
Mλ
p
ji − x
λjp
i β
λjp
1 − λtα
λjp
εejh
)
1
σεejh
, j ∈ {1, ..., Jλ}
132Here for simplicity the effort measurements are assumed to be continuous, but in the estimation
I use ordered probit specifications.
133Again, these measures are assumed to be continuous, but in the estimation I use ordered probit
specifications.
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Fi(learning skill measures | Typeλ = t) =
∏
j
f(Mλpji|x
λjp
i , λt,Ω) (A.8)
Let Ti = β
T
0 + x
h
i β
T
1 + e
p
i β
T
2 + λiβ
T
3 + ε
T
i , such that
Ti ∈ {GPA
p
i , SIMCE
p
math,i, SIMCE
p
verbal,i, SIMCE
p
socialscience,i, SIMCE
p
naturalscience,i}.
Given that, conditional on λi, x
h
i and e
h
i , the εi are independent across tests, the contri-
bution to the likelihood is given by134:
f(Ti|x
p
i , e
p
i , λt,Ω) = φ
(
Ti − β
T
0 − x
h
i β
T
1 − (M̂e
p
1i − x
e1p
i β
e1p
1 )β
T
2 + λtβ
T
3
σεT
)
1
σωT
,
Fi(primary school tests | Typeλ = t) =
∏
Ti
f(Ti|x
p
i , e
p
i , λt,Ω). (A.9)
Therefore, the likelihood contribution for the ith individual is thus:
Li(Ω) = (A.10)
log
(∑
t
Fi(high school tests | Typeλ = t) Fi(high school effort measures | Typeλ = t)
Fi(learning skill measures | Typeλ = t) Fi(primary school tests | Typeλ = t) πt
)
(A.11)
134M̂e
p
1i = δ̂1 +
∑Jep
m=2Me
p
miδ̂m and ω
T
i = ε
T
i − ε
e1p
i β
T
2 , where the δ̂s are the OLS coefficients.
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A.5 Results
First satge parameters
Table A.8: Primary School Attending Regression
(1)
VARIABLES ATTEN P
ME1==2 -0.133***
(0.0256)
ME1==3 -0.214***
(0.0360)
ME1==4 -0.218***
(0.0787)
ME2==2 0.0586**
(0.0258)
ME2==3 0.115***
(0.0284)
ME2==4 0.124***
(0.0393)
ME3==2 -0.0500*
(0.0263)
ME3==3 -0.123***
(0.0422)
ME3==4 -0.280***
(0.107)
STUDY LENG==2 0.0140
(0.0473)
STUDY LENG==3 -0.0481
(0.0497)
STUDY LENG==4 -0.380***
(0.0672)
STUDY MATH==2 0.0277
(0.0405)
STUDY MATH==3 -0.0286
(0.0432)
STUDY MATH==4 -0.0208
(0.0573)
Constant 95.82***
(0.0435)
Observations 146,319
R-squared 0.002
F statistic 16.99
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Some variables are omited due to perfect multicolinearity.
96
Table A.9: Repetitions Linear Probability Regression
(1)
VARIABLES REP BI
MS1==2 0.00174
(0.00154)
MS1==3 0.0290***
(0.00224)
MS1==4 0.0307***
(0.00581)
MS2==2 0.00425**
(0.00166)
MS2==3 0.0212***
(0.00283)
MS2==4 0.0287***
(0.00947)
MS3==2 0.00502**
(0.00196)
MS3==3 0.0172***
(0.00404)
MS3==4 0.0183
(0.0132)
MS4==2 0.000835
(0.00166)
MS4==3 0.0142***
(0.00300)
MS4==4 0.00883**
(0.00416)
Constant 0.0532***
(0.00107)
Observations 141,916
R-squared 0.006
F statistic 58.09
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Some variables are omited due to perfect multicolinearity.
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Table A.10: Secondary School Attending Regression
(1)
VARIABLES ATTEN S
EFFORT P 0.152***
(0.0278)
use space==3 0.111
(0.0819)
use space==4 0.371***
(0.0791)
use space==5 0.498***
(0.0798)
use sb==2 -0.635***
(0.102)
use sb==3 -0.353***
(0.0397)
use sb==4 -0.0721**
(0.0312)
use calc==3 0.376***
(0.0771)
use calc==4 0.837***
(0.0778)
use calc==5 0.873***
(0.0803)
Constant 93.14***
(0.105)
Observations 83,366
R-squared 0.013
F statistic 103.2
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Some variables are omited due to perfect multicolinearity.
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Table A.11: Two Stage Least Square for Primary Education Students’ Performance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
simcev simcem simcen simces gpap
VARIABLES SIMCE V P SIMCE M P SIMCE N P SIMCE S P GPA P
SEX -8.655*** 9.499*** 9.414*** 9.565*** -0.164***
(0.232) (0.222) (0.228) (0.230) (0.00258)
RURAL P 1.562*** 1.439*** 3.548*** 2.933*** 0.0627***
(0.463) (0.449) (0.434) (0.459) (0.00529)
SES P2 1.055** -0.880* 0.0666 0.626 -0.0681***
(0.529) (0.513) (0.488) (0.526) (0.00605)
SES P3 10.99*** 8.463*** 9.793*** 11.44*** -0.0697***
(0.581) (0.559) (0.536) (0.573) (0.00652)
SES P4 28.05*** 28.06*** 29.29*** 30.13*** -0.0390***
(0.653) (0.634) (0.615) (0.643) (0.00724)
SES P5 42.33*** 48.86*** 46.75*** 42.92*** 0.0632***
(1.040) (1.016) (1.044) (1.007) (0.0114)
EDU MO2 -6.537*** -5.747*** -6.131*** -5.259*** -0.0186***
(0.454) (0.430) (0.431) (0.447) (0.00512)
EDU MO3 -1.687*** -1.345*** -2.424*** -1.734*** 0.0456***
(0.380) (0.359) (0.367) (0.374) (0.00424)
EDU MO4 6.452*** 5.097*** 5.362*** 6.826*** 0.138***
(0.374) (0.355) (0.366) (0.368) (0.00414)
EDU MO5 9.035*** 7.438*** 8.870*** 10.36*** 0.146***
(0.467) (0.452) (0.469) (0.462) (0.00517)
EDU MO6 14.68*** 14.04*** 16.16*** 16.51*** 0.209***
(0.526) (0.508) (0.529) (0.519) (0.00585)
EDU FAC 6.646*** 7.574*** 8.040*** 6.743*** 0.0583***
(0.410) (0.401) (0.420) (0.407) (0.00455)
DEP P2 1.392*** 0.733*** 2.320*** 2.267*** -0.103***
(0.289) (0.276) (0.283) (0.287) (0.00318)
DEP P3 -0.515 -1.043 1.070 -2.413*** -0.136***
(0.851) (0.830) (0.882) (0.822) (0.00923)
ATTEN P hat -6.594*** -13.26*** -8.170*** -7.535*** 0.262***
(0.751) (0.711) (0.748) (0.732) (0.00813)
REP hat -347.8*** -430.5*** -360.9*** -379.0*** -6.906***
(5.985) (5.640) (5.874) (5.837) (0.0652)
LENG CONT 77.31***
(2.009)
MATH CONT 168.1***
(2.775)
NAT CONT 69.81***
(1.258)
SOC CONT 37.98***
(1.248)
Constant 838.8*** 1,387*** 997.0*** 955.6*** -18.65***
(71.99) (68.18) (71.72) (70.25) (0.780)
Observations 143,646 142,964 143,889 142,747 144,028
R-squared 0.202 0.278 0.247 0.201 0.143
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A.12: Two Stage Least Square for Secondary Education Students’ Performance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
simcev simcem psum psuv gpas
VARIABLES SIMCE V S SIMCE M S PSU M PSU V GPA S
SEX -7.136*** 11.66*** 23.28*** 3.641*** -28.31***
(0.271) (0.322) (0.579) (0.594) (0.572)
RURAL S -3.703*** -5.968*** -12.84*** -12.15*** -0.624
(0.763) (0.927) (1.768) (1.869) (1.650)
SES S2 10.02*** 13.94*** 22.80*** 24.38*** -4.249***
(0.443) (0.530) (1.058) (1.091) (0.935)
SES S3 29.05*** 39.20*** 82.08*** 77.91*** 11.86***
(0.506) (0.603) (1.142) (1.178) (1.078)
SES S4 44.82*** 65.23*** 134.3*** 122.1*** 30.27***
(0.635) (0.750) (1.357) (1.420) (1.339)
SES S5 53.15*** 79.01*** 166.9*** 151.2*** 57.56***
(1.289) (1.443) (2.538) (2.630) (2.818)
EDU MO2 -4.213*** 0.235 -1.655 -9.321*** 16.25***
(1.456) (1.737) (3.323) (3.430) (2.888)
EDU MO3 -0.757 4.018** 2.099 -4.819 14.84***
(1.430) (1.704) (3.238) (3.348) (2.830)
EDU MO4 6.147*** 11.08*** 15.17*** 10.40*** 24.08***
(1.427) (1.699) (3.221) (3.329) (2.824)
EDU MO5 9.046*** 13.78*** 20.05*** 18.37*** 26.28***
(1.459) (1.734) (3.271) (3.381) (2.899)
EDU MO6 16.54*** 21.63*** 37.82*** 37.63*** 43.86***
(1.482) (1.760) (3.310) (3.421) (2.959)
EDU FAC 6.973*** 9.051*** 20.59*** 20.08*** 16.39***
(0.451) (0.528) (0.880) (0.913) (0.975)
DEP S2 -2.134*** -2.407*** -14.71*** -11.13*** -13.03***
(0.315) (0.378) (0.693) (0.710) (0.657)
DEP S3 -1.673 -0.909 -1.440 -1.454 -9.691***
(1.167) (1.298) (2.256) (2.316) (2.555)
ATTEN S hat 3.817*** 4.724*** 11.52*** 10.54*** 26.94***
(0.296) (0.356) (0.641) (0.657) (0.614)
REP hat -316.3*** -462.2*** -736.7*** -675.2*** -971.5***
(6.754) (8.013) (14.32) (14.95) (13.58)
Constant -90.85*** -185.4*** -611.9*** -512.2*** -1,936***
(27.87) (33.50) (60.30) (61.84) (57.73)
Observations 107,632 107,613 86,817 86,817 107,766
R-squared 0.239 0.303 0.426 0.374 0.166
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Second stage parameters
Table A.13: Second Stage Parameters
Utility
θ1 0.0000139 (0.0000008) θ
2
3 0.00306 ( 0.00018) F¯C 0.0000001 (0.0050620)
θ2 3.6468447 (0.1390378) θ
3
3 -0.00075 ( 0.00011) σfc 4.1806149 (0.2548031)
θ13 0.0008679 (0.0001100) θ
4
3 -0.00099 ( 0.00016)
Production function of tests
β
smp
λ
-474.1999 ( 6.0361) βsvhe 3.9462 ( 0.6749) β
pv
const -475.8645 (123.3146)
β
svp
λ
-423.4805 ( 5.9159) βsvhλ -584.0101 ( 8.1491) β
gh
e 25.5289 ( 0.9754)
β
snp
λ
-8.1700 ( 0.0000) βsvhconst -83.4840 ( 63.3909) β
gh
λ
-1049.5653 ( 12.1455)
β
ssp
λ
-7.5346 ( 0.0000) βpme 11.2758 ( 1.3678) β
gh
const -1792.2654 ( 91.5724)
β
gp
λ
-6.5496 ( 0.0767) βpm
λ
-1183.4871 ( 14.9213) σpm 56.3147 ( 0.1301)
βsmhe 4.8272 ( 0.8289) β
pm
const -563.7606 (128.6623) σpv 53.5401 ( 0.1403)
βsmhλ -714.3026 ( 9.9824) β
pv
e 10.5432 ( 1.3109) σgh 70.5981 ( 0.1610)
βsmhconst -176.2544 ( 77.8534) β
pv
λ
-1293.8195 ( 15.5825)
Measures of student effort at high school
αe(effort p) 0.1099 ( 0.0076) Cut
2
sb 3.1656 ( 0.8147) Cut
3
sp 4.7551 ( 0.9201)
αconst(effort p) -10.9229 ( 0.7171) Cut
3
sb 4.3483 ( 0.8149) β
eh
ca (effort) 0.0388 ( 0.0084)
σatten 3.8072 ( 0.0073) β
eh
sp (effort) 0.0466 ( 0.0098) β
eh
ca (ses s2) 0.0002 ( 0.0103)
βehsb (effort) 0.0408 ( 0.0087) β
eh
sp (ses s2) 0.0520 ( 0.0128) β
eh
ca (ses s3) 0.0602 ( 0.0117)
βehsb (ses s2) -0.0650 ( 0.0108) β
eh
sp (ses s3) 0.1168 ( 0.0142) β
eh
ca (ses s4) 0.2092 ( 0.0150)
βehsb (ses s3) -0.0994 ( 0.0123) β
eh
sp (ses s4) 0.2183 ( 0.0173) β
eh
ca (ses s5) 0.2941 ( 0.0185)
βehsb (ses s4) -0.0287 ( 0.0155) β
eh
sp (ses s5) 0.3943 ( 0.0205) β
eh
ca (edu fac) 0.0447 ( 0.0115)
βehsb (ses s5) 0.3718 ( 0.0190) β
eh
sp (edu fac) 0.1128 ( 0.0123) Cut
1
ca 1.9459 ( 0.7840)
βehsb (edu fac) 0.0837 ( 0.0116) Cut
1
sp 2.6673 ( 0.9198) Cut
2
ca 3.5939 ( 0.7843)
Cut1sb 1.8099 ( 0.8143) Cut
2
sp 3.6418 ( 0.9199) Cut
3
ca 4.5660 ( 0.7843)
Measures and distribution of the learning skill
αλms1 5.6102 ( 0.0883) α
λ
ms3 4.4054 ( 0.0953) λ(Type1) 0.0001 (0.000017)
Cut1ms1 0.0402 ( 0.0063) Cut
1
ms3 0.9588 ( 0.0077) λ(Type2) 0.0561 ( 0.0006)
Cut2ms1 1.1359 ( 0.0070) Cut
2
ms3 1.9305 ( 0.0094) λ(Type3) 0.1078 ( 0.0011)
Cut3ms1 2.4898 ( 0.0098) Cut
3
ms3 0.9588 ( 0.0077) λ(Type4) 0.1620 ( 0.0016)
αλms2 4.2743 ( 0.0888) α
λ
ms4 3.8976 ( 0.0827) pi1 0.2375 ( 0.0158)
Cut1ms2 0.4338 ( 0.0070) Cut
1
ms4 0.5333 ( 0.0066) pi2 0.3364 ( 0.0160)
Cut2ms2 1.4490 ( 0.0081) Cut
2
ms4 1.4438 ( 0.0074) pi3 0.3169 ( 0.0156)
Cut3ms2 2.6893 ( 0.0128) Cut
3
ms4 2.1435 ( 0.0084) pi4 0.1092
The estimated parameters for the unobserved types probabilities are: p1, p2 and p3, where pi1 =
p1
p1+p2+p3+1
. The reported (SEi) refers to pi.
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Model fit
Table A.14: Model fit by different groups
PSU math PSU verbal GPA
Model Data Model Data Model Data
All 508 508 505 505 537 538
Female 494 496 500 502 550 550
Male 525 522 511 509 523 523
SES 1 423 418 422 417 516 506
SES 2 452 453 453 454 517 511
SES 3 517 528 515 526 542 548
SES 4 581 590 573 581 570 582
SES 5 640 638 626 623 611 619
F wo college 490 490 488 488 529 528
F w college 597 602 589 592 591 599
Public 475 476 472 474 530 528
Private Sub 503 503 502 502 530 531
Private non Sub 637 635 622 621 607 616
Figure A.1: Tests 2006
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Figure A.2: Tests 2004
(a) Simce math 2004
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(c) Simce natural science 2004
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
x 10−3
D
en
si
ty
Simce social science
 
 
Data
Model
(d) Simce social science 2004
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Figure A.3: Fraction of the students taking the PSU by groups
(a) By gender
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Unobserved types
Figure A.4: Conditional probabilities of learning skill types by groups
(a) All and by gender
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A.6 Counterfactual Experiments
Figure A.5: Impact of introducing quotas by SES on universities’ socioeconomic
composition
(a) SES = 1
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(b) SES = 2
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(c) SES = 3
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Figure A.6: Impact of changing GPA weight from 0.4 to 0.5 on universities’ socioe-
conomic composition
(a) SES = 1
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Figure A.7: Impact of changing GPA weight from 0.4 to 0.7 on universities’ socioe-
conomic composition
(a) SES = 1
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Figure A.8: The impact on effort of quota by SES
(a) Densities
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Note: ({Yes,No},{Yes,No}) stands for (Whether the students were taking the PSU in baseline scenario,Whether the students
are taking the PSU in counterfactual scenario).
Figure A.9: The impact on effort of changing GPA weight
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(c) From not taking to taking the PSU
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Figure A.10: Impact of Quota system on tests by SES and universities
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(d) Final Scores by universities
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Note: ({Yes,No},{Yes,No}) stands for (Whether the students were taking the PSU in baseline scenario,Whether the students
are taking the PSU in counterfactual scenario).
110
Figure A.11: Impact of SES-Quota system on who is taking the PSU
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Figure A.12: Impact of changing GPA weight on who is taking the PSU
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Figure A.13: The impact on final-score cutoff and college admissions of introducing
SES-Quota system, with and without endogenous effort
(a) Final-score cutoff
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Figure A.14: The impact on final-score cutoff of changing the GPA weight, with and
without endogenous effort
(a) GPA weight = 0.5
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(b) GPA weight = 0.7
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Figure A.15: The impact of changing the GPA weight on university admissions, with
and without endogenous effort
(a) GPA weight = 0.5
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Appendix B
A Dynamic Model of Elementary
School Choice
B.1 Figures and Tables
Table B.1: Fraction of students changing school
2nd 3th 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th N
All 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.04 77432
Mother’s education
Incomplete 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 6962
elementary school
Complete 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.03 8182
elementary school
Incomplete 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.04 11085
secondary school
Complete 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.04 29667
secondary school
Complete or 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.06 21536
incomplete college
Note: I drop the students who fail at least one class between 1st and 8th grade,
and I also drop the students whose families switch the municipality where they
live.
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Table B.2: Total school change
0 1 2 >2 N
All 0.69 0.24 0.05 0.01 77432
Mother’s education
Incomplete 0.78 0.19 0.03 0.01 6962
elementary school
Complete 0.75 0.20 0.04 0.01 8182
elementary school
Incomplete 0.72 0.22 0.05 0.01 11085
secondary school
Complete 0.68 0.26 0.05 0.01 29667
secondary school
Complete or 0.65 0.27 0.07 0.02 21536
incomplete college
Note: I drop the students who fail at least one class between
1st and 8th grade, and I also drop the students whose families
switch the municipality where they live.
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Table B.3: Descriptive Statistics of the Two Samples
Estimation Sample Complete Sample
Parents with Low Education 0.209 0.187
Parents with Medium Education 0.428 0.384
Parents with High Education 0.363 0.429
Religious Family 0.212 0.260
Parents Attend School Meeting* 0.946 0.948
Parents Explain Class Material** 0.469 0.474
Parents Help Student Study*** 0.402 0.391
Parents Care about Quality**** 0.377 0.395
N 9752 19819
All the figures are proportions.
(*) From the question: How often do you attend the periodic parents’ meeting of your child’s class? I construct
a dummy variable that takes one if parenst always or almost always attend, and zero otherwise.
(**) From the question: How often does one of your parents explain you the class material that you don’t understand? I
construct a dummy variable that takes one if the answer is always or almost always attend, and zero otherwise.
(***) From the question: How often does one of your parents help you to study? I construct a dummy variable that takes
one if the answer is always or almost always attend, and zero otherwise.
(****) From the question: Name the first three reasons why you chose your child’s current school.; I construct a dummy
variable that takes one if parenst name school quality as one of the reasons, and zero otherwise.
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B.2 Estimated Parameters and Model’s Inputs
Model’s Inputs and Parameters Estimated Outside the Model
Figure B.1: Histogram of the Size of the Choice Sets
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Figure B.2: Distribution of Estimated Quality by School Type in 2004
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Table B.4: Knowledge Production Function
Coeff Std Err.
Accumulated School Quality at 8th Grade 1.07 0.0124
Parents with Medium Level of Education 5.52 0.2523
Parents with High Level of Education 8.72 0.3007
Constant 255.49 0.2047
N = 55, 421
R2 = 0.2113
Note: This is the result of estimating the Knowledge Production Function
K˜ijT = α0Xi + α1
∑T
t=1 q˜ijt + ϑijT .
The omitted dummy variable is Parents with Low Level of Education.
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Table B.5: GPA Production Function
4th 2005 4th 2006 4th 2007 4th 2008 4th 2009 8th 2011
Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE
Entered in 2nd -0.07 0.0034 -0.06 0.0034 -0.06 0.0038 -0.06 0.0039 -0.07 0.0034 -0.05 0.0054
Entered in 3th -0.08 0.0033 -0.08 0.0033 -0.08 0.0036 -0.07 0.0038 -0.07 0.0033 -0.04 0.0050
Entered in 4th -0.11 0.0030 -0.11 0.0030 -0.12 0.0035 -0.10 0.0037 -0.11 0.0032 -0.06 0.0048
Entered in 5th -0.06 0.0045
Entered in 6th -0.08 0.0045
Entered in 7th -0.10 0.0040
Entered in 8th -0.17 0.0046
Constant 3.63 0.0063 3.72 0.0062 3.74 0.0066 3.75 0.0066 3.72 0.0065 3.02 0.0097
N 214,661 210,177 162,552 169,500 178,685 161,920
Adjusted R-squared .549 .545 .559 .537 .558 .465
Note: This is the result of estimating the GPA production function Gijt = λ
t
0j + λ
t
1jKijt + λ
t
2TAit + ε
g
ijt, where I only
present the values for λt2. The omitted dummy variable is Entered in 1st grade.
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Figure B.3: GPA Standards
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Note: Giving the GPA production function Gijt = λt0j + λ
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g
ijt; λ0j is the constant and λ0j
the slope.
Parameters estimated by Simulated Maximum Likelihood
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Table B.6: Parameters of the Utility Function
Coeff Std Err. Coeff Std Err.
Student Knowledge in t < T (βkt) 0.0000 0.0045 Student Knowledge in T (βkT ) 0.0546 0.0184
∆βkt of Involved Parents 0.0000 0.0119 ∆βkT of Involved Parents 0.0024 0.0453
Medium Low SES School 0.0376 0.0224 Medium SES School 0.0960 0.0232
Medium High SES School 0.0972 0.0268 High SES School 0.1200 0.0379
School Tuition Fee -0.0140 0.0068 Voucher-Private School -0.0006 0.0053
Non Voucher-Private School 0.0611 0.0218 Religious School ∗ Religious Parents 0.2525 0.0173
Student GPA 0.0311 0.0500 GPA Correctiion Gijt−1 − Ĝijt−1 0.0478 0.0081
Home and School in Different Municipalities -0.3454 0.0056 School Offers Secondary Education 0.0402 0.0354
GPA at time T 0.0600 0.4542 Years Enrroled in Current School (at T ) 0.0838 0.0091
Switch Cost -5.9096 0.0286 Public School (2nd cycle) 1.4814 0.0527
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Table B.7: Parameters of the Adsmission Probability Function
Coeff Std Err. Coeff Std Err.
Constant (1st Grade) -0.3150 0.0133 School Quality ∗ Selk (1st Gr.) -0.1000 0.0125
School Quality ∗ Selg (1st Gr.) -0.2107 0.0183 School Quality ∗ Selo (1st Gr.) -0.0964 0.0199
Selk (1st Gr.) -0.0614 0.0103 K ∗ Selk (1st Gr.) 0.0033 0.0001
Selm (1st Gr.) -0.0050 0.0111 MR ∗ Selm (1st Gr.) 0.0006 0.0055
Selr (1st Gr.) -0.0280 0.0121 Religious∗Selr (1st Gr.) 0.0009 0.0213
Selo (1st Gr.) -0.0221 0.0082 Tuition Fee ∗ Low Education (1st Gr.) -1.9624 0.2115
Tuition Fee ∗ Medium Education (1st Gr.) -1.0137 0.0263 Tuition Fee ∗ High Education (1st Gr.) -0.1745 0.0203
School selectivity(+) ∗ Low Ed. (1st Gr.) -2.2012 0.2312 School selectivity ∗ Medium Ed. (1st Gr.) -0.9976 0.0842
School selectivity ∗ High Ed. (1st Gr.) 0.0017 0.0073 Constant (2nd-8th Grade) -0.7455 0.0172
School Quality ∗ Selk (2nd-8th) -0.1000 0.0123 School Quality ∗ Selg (2nd-8th) -0.1888 0.0141
School Quality ∗ Selo (2nd-8th) -0.0999 0.0160 Selk (2nd-8th) -0.0525 0.0158
K ∗ Selk (2nd-8th) 0.0002 0.0001 Selg (2nd-8th) -0.0200 0.0067
GPA ∗ Selg (2nd-8th) 0.0010 0.0007 Selm (2nd-8th) -0.0103 0.0006
MR ∗ Selm (2nd-8th) 0.0020 0.0027 Selr (2nd-8th) -0.0200 0.0102
Religious∗Selr (2nd-8th) 0.0019 0.0655 Selo (2nd-8th) -0.0100 0.0092
New School (2nd-8th) 1.0087 0.3220 New School ∗ School Size (2nd-8th) 0.0025 0.0029
Tuition Fee ∗ Low Education (2nd-8th) -0.7037 0.1729 Tuition Fee ∗ Medium Education (2nd-8th) -0.5036 0.0460
Tuition Fee ∗ High Education (2nd-8th) -0.1967 0.0160 School selectivity(++) ∗ Low Ed. (2nd-8th) 0.4190 0.1552
School selectivity ∗ Medium Ed. (2nd-8th) 0.1221 0.0052 School selectivity ∗ High Ed. (2nd-8th) -0.0058 0.0087
(+) School Selectivity at first grade is defined as (Selk + Selo)/2.
(++) School Selectivity between 2nd and 8th grade is defined as (Selk + Selo + Selg)/3.
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Table B.8: Parameters that Determine Parents’ Quality Perception
Coeff Std Err. Coeff Std Err.
Low Education (Math SIMCE) 0.0003 0.6083 Medium Education (Math SIMCE) 0.0094 0.0563
High Education (Math SIMCE) 0.0003 0.3222 Size of the Choice Set (Math SIMCE) 0.0074 0.0006
Low Education (Spanish SIMCE) 0.0000 0.5754 Medium Education (Spanish SIMCE) 0.0002 0.1638
High Education (Spanish SIMCE) 0.0002 0.1724 Size of the Choice Set (Spanish SIMCE) 0.0000 0.0000
Table B.9: Parameters of the Parents Involment Probability Function
Coeff Std Err. Coeff Std Err.
Constant -0.8873 0.1223 Parents Attend School Meetings 0.2544 1.4731
Parents Explain Class Material 0.0248 0.2497 Parents Help to Study -0.2164 0.2939
Parents Care about Quality 0.2335 0.2577
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B.3 Model Fit and Counterfactual Experiments
(Complete Sample)
Model Fit
Figure B.4: Model fit for the complete sample
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Counterfactual Experiments
Table B.10: Fraction of students changing school by grade (with respect to baseline
in percentage points), complete sample.
Baseline No misperception Only Q All admitted Random C ∗ 0.9 New All ED = 3
maters admission locations
2nd 5.3% -0.2 0.4 10.5 0.2 3.7 -1.0 -0.1
3th 4.8% -0.1 1.0 10.1 0.2 3.7 -0.8 -0.1
4th 4.4% -0.1 1.3 9.9 0.2 3.4 -0.7 -0.1
5th 4.1% -0.1 1.8 9.7 0.2 3.3 -0.6 -0.1
6th 3.7% -0.1 1.9 9.2 0.2 3.1 -0.7 -0.1
7th 4.4% -0.2 1.6 8.5 0.0 3.3 -1.0 -0.2
8th 3.4% -0.1 2.3 8.2 -0.1 2.7 -0.6 -0.2
Table B.11: Student fraction by school type at first grade (with respect to baseline
in percentage points), complete sample.
Baseline No misperception Only Q All admitted Random C ∗ 0.9 New All ED = 3
maters admission locations
Public 27.9% 0.9 2.3 -3.3 -2.3 0.7 0.1 -2.8
Voucher Private 59.4% -0.3 -2.9 -0.6 -0.7 -0.2 9.9 1.9
Non voucher 12.6% -0.6 0.7 3.9 3.0 -0.5 -9.9 0.9
Private
Table B.12: Gain of knowledge (KT − K0) by parents education (with respect to
baseline in standard deviations), complete sample.
Baseline No misperception Only Q All admitted Random C ∗ 0.9 New All ED = 3
maters admission locations
Low educated -0.206 -0.016 0.021 0.099 0.053 0.001 0.130 0.071
Medium 0.042 -0.029 0.103 0.205 0.127 -0.003 -0.003 0.133
educated
High educated 1.007 -0.060 0.168 0.152 0.069 -0.027 -0.327 -0.014
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